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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of house prices in a sample of European countries 
over the period 1970-2004. Focusing on the role of financial liberalization, we find that it has 
mainly affected the short term dynamics of residential prices. In particular, the impulse 
effects on house prices of income and mortgage debt have become smaller. On the other hand 
the effects of interest rates, past house prices and, to a lesser degree, stock market have 
strengthened. In other words, there seems to have been a certain “de-linking” of short term 
house price dynamics from income, whereas the housing market may have become more 
similar to a financial asset market, with interest rates and expectations of capital gains 
playing a more prominent role.  
Keywords: house prices, financial liberalization, cointegration, error correction mechanism. 
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1. Introduction 
House price changes in Europe have been largely attributed in recent years to developments 
in the financial markets, namely the fall of interest rates and the easing of credit constraints 
following financial market liberalisation. Consequently, the return to less favourable credit 
conditions has been feared to trigger a sharp downturn in the housing market in Europe as in 
the U.S. However, despite widespread conviction of the importance of financial factors on 
house price dynamics, the empirical evidence is relatively thin and often difficult to interpret, 
especially when it comes to studies outside the U.S. and the U.K.  
The earlier cross- or multi-country studies of house price dynamics focused primarily on the 
interest rate channel (see for example Kennedy and Andersen, 1994, Englund and Ioannides, 
1997, Kasparova and White, 2001). For the most part, interest rates (or the user cost of 
capital) were found to have a statistically significant, though quantitatively limited impact on 
house prices. Other financial variables and, in particular bank credit, have also been 
introduced in some recent empirical country-specific and cross-country studies, on the 
grounds that there may be credit rationing. The role of credit was explored early on in 
country specific models, particularly for the U.K. (see for instance Hendry (1984) and Meen 
(1990)) and was also taken up in the more general discussion on the determinants of asset 
price dynamics. A certain coincidence in recent years between credit cycles and house prices 
in countries other than just the U.K. has brought the possible relation between the two back 
into the limelight. Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), IMF (2004), Lecat and Mésonnier (2005), Ott 
(2006) and others have explored the role of bank credit in house price models covering 
several countries.  
In general, credit quantity variables in these studies turned out to be statistically significant, 
though, in many cases endogeneity may have been an issue of concern.1 The construction of 
alternative measures of “credit availability” or “excess liquidity”, apart from raising 
additional methodological and measurement issues, has not been empirically very successful. 
From the theoretical point of view, the general lack of a well defined theoretical framework 
makes the interpretation of the results more difficult. Perhaps even more to the point, there 
seems to be a significant gap between, on the one hand, the theoretical discussions on 
structural changes in the mortgage markets and the financial system in general and, on the 
 
1 Hofmann (2003) examined the two-way relationship of property prices and bank lending in a sample of 20 
countries. His evidence suggests that the long-run relationship runs from property prices to bank lending, while 
in the short run causality may be running both ways. See also Hofmann (2004). 
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other, the little emphasis the empirical literature has placed in detecting any changes over 
time in the relation between house price dynamics and financial variables. Noticeable 
exceptions are provided by Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) who argue that financial 
liberalization of mortgage markets led to notable shifts in house price behaviour making real 
interest rates relatively more important. A similar argument has been made by Iacoviello and 
Minetti (2003) who have estimated that in Finland, Sweden and the U.K. the sensitivity of 
house prices to short term interest rates has increased over time, probably as a result of the 
process of financial deregulation.  
This paper takes another look at house price dynamics and their relation to financial factors, 
and attempts to close some of the gaps in the existing cross-country empirical literature. First, 
we briefly consider what the theory has to say about financial factors in household housing 
investment decisions. We argue that apart from the interest rate channel, there are likely to  
be other channels through which financial conditions affect household’s housing decisions. 
Non-interest rate financial factors, in particular, are expected a priori to have most of their 
impact in the shorter term dynamics of housing demand. We then present an econometric 
analysis using panel data within a traditional error correction mechanism (ECM) approach, 
and assess the importance of macroeconomic and financial variables for house price 
dynamics in the short and long run. Our data set includes most of the commonly used 
explanatory factors of house prices, including some supply side variables that are often absent 
in empirical research. The sample covers 11 EU countries, starting from the early 1970s to 
2004 (annual data). As a final step, we look for indications that suggest that the financial 
liberalization process has affected house price dynamics and the relation between financial 
factors and house prices. 
In short, our results suggest that house prices are cointegrated with disposable income, 
interest rates and mortgage debt, whereas we have problems identifying with certainty the 
role of other variables, notably that of demographics and housing supply. Financial factors 
seem to play an important role in short term house price dynamics. When we then explore 
changes in the estimated coefficients in the pre and post periods of mortgage market 
liberalization, we find that the main differences between the two sub-periods concern the 
short run dynamics. The impulse effect of both income and mortgage debt falls in the more 
recent period, compared to the period prior to liberalization. On the contrary, we find that the 
impulse effect from mortgage interest rates and stock prices increases significantly in the 
more recent period, as does also the “persistence” of house prices. Loosely speaking, the 
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housing market would seem to have become over time more similar to a financial asset 
market, where the market interest rates and expectations of capital gains play a more 
prominent role in household decisions. To the extent that our relatively short time series 
allows us to say, short term house price dynamics seem to have become more complex in the 
more recent period, possibly because of the role capital gain expectations have come to play.  
Section 2 provides a brief theoretical discussion of the role of financial factors for housing 
demand. After a preliminary examination of the data and a discussion of the baseline 
specification in Section 3, the empirical investigation is then carried out in two parts. In 
Section 4 we consider a reduced form panel data model for the whole period. The aim is to 
check and, where possible, improve upon the standard empirical relation between house 
prices and financial factors. Section 5 looks at possible indirect changes of financial 
liberalization on the short and long run determinants. Finally, Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Financial Factors in Housing Decisions 
Textbook analysis of housing decisions is based on simple assumptions about the financial 
side, namely that individual households face either a perfectly elastic or a perfectly inelastic 
supply of credit. The former is equivalent to the Jorgenson type of model in corporate 
investment. The perfectly inelastic credit supply (when debt or the debt-asset ratio exceeds a 
certain level) is instead the building block for the familiar financial accelerator models. 
Though not particularly realistic, both assumptions simplify considerably the modelling of 
household decisions and each provides an explanation for including either price (interest rate, 
user cost of capital) or credit quantity variables in empirical relationships. 
A more subtle difference between the two is that the Jorgenson type of models are essentially 
models about stocks or long run plans, while the financial accelerator models are about flows 
or the short run adjustment from one optimal stock position to another. This point is shown 
formally in Annex 1 where we consider a somewhat more realistic credit supply function that 
combines a perfectly elastic portion with an upward-sloping part. The former captures the 
“going” mortgage interest rate, i.e. a rate closely linked to the return of other assets and 
charged to the most credit worthy households. We can think of this as the mortgage interest 
rate “floor”. The upward-sloping part can be thought of as a rising premium paid by less 
credit worthy households with higher debt-asset ratios. A premium of this type may take the 
form of a higher mortgage interest rate or a non-interest rate cost incurred for example when 
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the household is asked for extra collateral, fees, an additional insurance or is faced with less 
convenient contractual mortgage terms. At the limit, credit may be rationed (for example 
when the debt-asset ratio is around 1), at which point the premium function becomes 
perfectly inelastic.  
As might be expected, the introduction of the above credit supply function combines 
elements of both the Jorgenson type of investment models and the financial accelerator 
models. Households’ housing optimal plans depend both on the “going” mortgage interest 
rates and on the credit standards and credit constraints that affect the above mentioned 
premium function. Perhaps more interesting for the empirical work and less obvious a priori 
is the suggestion that one needs to distinguish between short and long run effects of financial 
factors. In particular, the first order conditions from the dynamic optimisation model in 
Annex 1 suggest that the “going” mortgage interest rate will affect both the short and long 
run housing plans. The premium function on the other hand and the credit constraints, play a 
predominant role in the short term adjustment path but less so in the longer term housing 
plans (the “flow” issue mentioned above). Indeed, under certain circumstances, the optimality 
conditions suggest that the premium function and the credit constraints will not affect the 
long run housing plan at all. 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Consider, for example, what would happen 
if, other things being equal, a household were given access to a higher debt-asset ratio at the 
same interest rate. If the household were planning to accumulate housing assets and did not 
have sufficient own funds, the access to more debt could induce it to anticipate some of its 
housing purchases. A younger household for example would be less constrained by its current 
income and could acquire its own house sooner; an older household could “move up” the 
housing ladder faster. While the short run housing demand is thus affected, the long run 
housing plan of each household is likely to be little changed by the easier access to debt. In 
planning for the longer run the household needs to keep an eye on its expected “permanent” 
income and borrow accordingly. Flow constraints and rising marginal costs of debt are 
important for the ability of households to “smooth” short run income variations, but less so 
when it comes to planning their longer run portfolio. 
This does not mean that credit conditions other than the mortgage interest rates play no role 
in long term dynamics of housing demand. For instance, in the above example, even though 
the long run housing plans of individual households do not change when credit constraints are 
relaxed, it is still true that younger people will move out of the family and acquire larger 
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houses earlier in their life cycle. Thus, on the aggregate, a relaxation of credit constraints may 
lead to permanently higher demand for housing services. The main point to draw from the 
above is that the non-interest rate financial conditions should primarily (but not exclusively) 
affect the dynamics (timing) of housing demand.  
Interestingly for our purposes, the above discussion has also some potential implications on 
how structural changes in the mortgage market may affect housing demand. Though 
structural changes in the mortgage market cannot easily be identified or measured, there is 
wide agreement in the literature as to how liberalisation may have affected credit standards 
and mortgage credit availability. Mortgage market liberalisation is generally thought to have 
made access to credit easier for a large number of households that were previously effectively 
excluded from the market. More competition and better credit rating techniques should have 
led mortgage lending institutions to give less weight on current income and wealth when 
evaluating the credit worthiness of a household and put more weight on factors signalling 
high future income. Moreover, with a wider variety of products available in the market and a 
more persistent marketing of these products by credit institutions, households, particularly 
young households, are thought to have been better able to find the mortgage products that 
best fit their income profile. Thus, they should have been less constrained by their current 
income and wealth and would have had access to larger loan-to-value or debt-to-asset ratios 
other things being equal. While the possible effects of market liberalisation on quantitative 
constraints are relatively unambiguous, those on average mortgage costs are a priori more 
ambiguous. On the one hand, increased competition has probably reduced spreads. On the 
other, the move from a heavily regulated and sometimes subsidised mortgage system to a 
freer market may have raised average mortgage interest rates (other things being equal) at 
least for some households.  
In terms of the stylised model in the Annex 1, the premium function (.) would have shifted 
to the right and down. The “going” (floor) mortgage interest rate, on the other hand, may (or 
may not) have changed and possibly, other things being equal, it has even increased bringing 
mortgage rates closer to going market rates. The overall effect of mortgage market  
liberalisation on marginal mortgage costs is difficult to say a priori, but it is widely thought 
to have been negative (i.e. reduced marginal costs), thus boosting housing demand in the 
short run. If the arguments above are correct, financial liberalisation should have affected 
first and above all the short run dynamics of housing demand, but less so the long run 
relation. This is the issue we return to in the last section of this paper.   
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3. The Dataset and Model Specification   
As is the case with many of the house price studies in Europe, the empirical model is heavily 
conditioned by data availability. As can be seen from Annex 2, data sources are disperse and 
data is of varying quality. We use only annual data, both because we believe these to be more 
reliable and because we thus have a better coverage of EU countries and time.  
We use a standard error-correction model (ECM), which permits a relatively straightforward 
estimation of short and long run effects in a single equation, what is of some interest in the 
context of the discussion of financial factors, as seen above.2 In particular, we start from the 
following general unrestricted ECM specification: 
(1) 
2 2
'
, , , 1 , 1
1 0
it i j i t j i t j j i t i t it
j j
y y yµ      
= =
 = +  +  + + +
 
 X - . X
where 1,2,...,t T= and 1,2,...,i N= , iµ represents the country-specific intercept or fixed 
effect, ,i tX is a 1 k× vector of variables assumed to cointegrate with ity ,  is the error-
correction coefficient determining the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium, .
the vector of (non-normalised) long-run coefficients, and it the error term. Direct 
estimation of equation (1) allows us to obtain also the short-run dynamics, which are given 
by contemporaneous and lagged changes of ,i tX and lagged changes of ity . The variables 
included are all those suggested by the theoretical model above and, more or less, standard 
in the literature. Beside the “real” house prices (RHP), our dependent variable, the vector 
,i tX includes the real disposable income per capita (RDIPC), the real mortgage rate 
(RMRATE), the real stock of mortgage debt per capita (RMDEBT) and the total population 
over 24 years of age  (POP). The income and debt variables are normalised with the 
population over 24 years of age, as this is a priori considered to be a better proxy of the 
number of households. Additionally, we introduce the real stock market index (RSP) as one 
possible (rather imperfect) proxy of financial wealth. 
The stylised theoretical model of the previous section referred exclusively to housing 
demand. Typically, housing supply is considered to be inelastic in the short run. Reduced 
form housing price equations are therefore basically inverse demand equations with housing 
capital added in the long run relation to capture the long run supply effects. As a result, we 
 
2 This empirical approach is standard in the housing literature. Moreover, we opt for a single-equation rather 
than a two-stage ECM model, because in finite samples, under the presence of cointegration, the bias in the 
estimates of the cointegrating relationship is larger in static models than in dynamic models (Banerjee, et al,
1986).      
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introduce the residential housing stock (HSTOCK), and the “real” construction cost index 
(RCOST) both in the short and in the long run. Even though housing capital may be taken as 
given in the short run, variations in construction costs can affect short term house price 
dynamics if they affect expectations of prices of new houses in the future.3
Before implementing the ECM model, we test for the order of integration of the single 
variables used in the estimation. For this purpose, two sets of assumptions can be made for 
which two standard panel procedures are available. The first test (Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) 
- LLC) employs the null hypothesis of a common unit root process across cross-sections, 
implying that the persistence or autoregressive parameter is the same across countries. The 
second test (Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) - IPS) allows for individual unit root processes 
meaning that the autoregressive coefficients vary across-sections and combines the individual 
unit root tests to derive a panel specific statistic. From the panel unit root tests (Table 1), it 
can be seen that most variables are found to be integrated of order one in level. The only 
relevant exception is the LLC test, which indicates that POP is stationary in level. All in all, 
we do not have enough evidence to discard the presence of a unit root in all the variables 
under investigation, and in what follows we will test the presence of cointegration between 
these variables in level. 
Table 2 displays the results of the panel cointegration tests of Pedroni (1999). These tests are 
based on a panel unit root test of the residuals from a regression which allows for 
heterogeneous slope coefficients, fixed effects and individual specific deterministic trends. 
Pedroni develops seven cointegration statistics under the null of no cointegration. Four of 
them (“panel” statistics: panel v-statistic, the panel  -statistic, and a non-parametric and 
parametric t-statistic) pool the autoregressive coefficient in the residual based test, whereas 
three additional three statistics (“group” statistics: group  -statistic and two group t-
statistics) take the average. One side of the standard normal distribution is used as rejection 
region. With the exception of the panel v-statistic where the upper-side is used, for all the 
other tests the lower-side is applied. The main advantage of these tests is that they allow for 
the presence of heterogeneity of the co-integrating vectors, but the obvious drawback is that 
in the presence of small T, the country-specific estimates may be subject to substantial biases, 
above all when a large number of non stationary variables are included.   
 
3 All variables other than the interest rates are in logs. Annex 2 contains a detailed definition of all variables. 
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9
Table 2 shows the cointegration tests for the specifications either with fixed effects or with 
fixed effects and individual linear trends. With the only exception of the group-t test, no test 
rejects the null of no cointegration in the general specification in columns 1 (RHP, RDIPC,
RMRATE, POP, HSTOCK, RCOST, RMDEBT and RSP). Columns (2), (3) and (4) test for the 
presence of cointegration between a subset of the variables included in the general 
specification. Again, except for the panel and grout t-statistics of the standard model 
accounting for demographic and supply conditions, no test supports the presence of 
cointegration. Finally, column (5) shows the results for the basic three-variable model in 
RHP, RDIPC and RMRATE. Four tests reject the null of no cointegration in the specification 
without individual linear trends. From the above results, evidence of cointegration is stronger 
for a more parsimonious model, rather than a more general one which includes demographic, 
housing supply and mortgage debt effects. As will be seen below, these findings tend to be 
consistent with the results obtained within the ECM approach.  
Before discussing the main results, two econometric aspects are worth mentioning from the 
outset. Firstly, due to the annual frequency of the dataset and the resulting problems of 
degrees of freedom which may result from the estimation of country-specific models, we will 
impose homogenous parameters across countries. At the same time, however, we allow for 
heterogeneity by including fixed effects and, as a robustness check, also individual linear 
trends. The former captures the impact of all time-invariant determinants of house price 
growth, whereas the latter accounts for potentially omitted trending determinants of house 
prices (see below for a discussion). For comparison, we also present the results from a 
regression where we allow heterogeneity in short term dynamics. The second econometric 
aspect refers to the choice of estimation method. The use of fixed effects and a lagged term in 
a ECM specification raises the question whether our estimates are inconsistent as is the case 
in typical dynamic panel models with a small time dimension. However, the typical Arellano-
Bond methodology applied to dynamic panel data models is designed for samples with a 
large cross-section, which is not the case in our dataset, and, more importantly, our panel is 
large enough in the time dimension, suggesting  that the use of the ordinary fixed effects 
model is more appropriate in our case. 
 
4. Estimation Results of Benchmark Model  
Table 3 below presents the empirical results from ECM models. We start with the standard 
benchmark model, of the “Jorgenson” type, where the only explicit financial variable is the 
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real mortgage interest rate. The other independent variables are the real disposable income 
per capita, the population over 24 years of age (as a proxy for the number of households), the 
housing capital stock per capita and the real construction cost index. The latter two variables 
capture supply side effects. The disposable income variable may capture in the short run both 
the change in expected life cycle income and the possible effects of additional internal 
finance. In a “Jorgenson” type of world, the availability of internal finance should not be of 
relevance in principle, but changes in disposable income are still likely to have an effect on 
housing demand via the expectations channel.  
In a first general specification (not presented here) we introduced all independent variables in 
both lagged levels and first differences to capture long and short run effects. We have 
experimented with contemporaneous and lagged first differences. It turned out that the 
contemporaneous first difference of income, the lagged first difference of real mortgage rates 
and the contemporaneous and lagged difference of construction costs sufficiently capture the 
short term dynamics. Housing stock and population enter only in the long run relation.4
Column 1 in Table 3 presents the estimation results from the “trimmed” version of the 
benchmark model, after having dropped the statistically non significant short term effects. All 
estimated coefficients have the expected signs and reasonable orders of magnitude. In the 
short run, an increase in real income of 1% is estimated to raise real house prices in the same 
period by close to 0.6%. An increase of the mortgage interest rate by 100 basis points is 
estimated to bring down real house prices by close to 0.5% with one year delay. A rise of real 
construction costs is found to have a positive but short lived effect, which is largely reversed 
a year later.5 A significant part of a house price increase/decrease would seem to carry over to 
the next year. The “persistence” coefficient (of the lagged dependent variable) is estimated to 
be above 0.5. In the long run, the main effects come from the disposable income and 
population variables. The elasticity of real house prices with respect to income is estimated to 
1, that with respect to population to 2.8. The elasticity with respect to housing capital stock is 
-1.4, although only statistically significant at 10% level. The estimated semi-elasticity with 
respect to the real mortgage rate is -1.3 and the elasticity with respect to real construction 
costs is 0.1. Both, however, are not statistically significant. All in all, these findings are 
 
4 In preliminary estimates we have also added year fixed effects. The inclusion of the latter, however, makes the 
effect of the real interest rate in the long run insignificant. This could well be a reflection of the fact that real 
interest rates have had broadly similar long term patterns in most EU countries, though changes have not always 
been synchronised. The short run effect of interest rates remains statistically significant and quantitatively 
important. The rest of the results changed little when time dummies were present.   
5 We return to the question of the construction costs below. 
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qualitatively consistent with a number of recent empirical studies on house price 
determination (see OECD, 2005 for a survey).     
The model in column (1) shows signs of autocorrelation (see bottom of the table). Moreover, 
the residuals from individual countries show some long term pattern. The residuals from 
Germany in particular have a clear negative trend. Finally, for some countries, there seems to 
be much more noise in the data in the first years of the sample, possibly due to more 
measurement errors in that period. Italy and Belgium present the clearest cases of this. In the 
following regressions, we consider these issues in more detail.  
A priori, we would expect that some of the above problems, particularly those concerning 
autocorrelation and the long term patterns in the residuals, may be due to omitted variables 
and/or systematic measurement errors. Even before turning to the financial side, we can think 
of different potential omitted factors, some of them concerning the supply side, such as 
construction land availability and cost, innovations in construction technology, changing 
social habits, urbanisation and regulations etc. Further, systematic measurement errors may 
arise among other things because of failing to correct prices for changes in house 
characteristics in terms of quality, size, location or amenities. This type of factors and errors 
are very hard to measure, but one may reasonably assume that they are likely to have changed 
more or less monotonically over a number of years, though not necessarily with the same rate 
across countries. If so, a country specific trend variable could be expected to capture much of 
their effect. The drawback of course is that by effectively de-trending our data we are 
removing a lot of variation, potentially making the long run coefficients ill-determined. Like 
ordinary dummy variables, country-specific trends do not tell us much about the true 
underlying factors driving the long run relations.6
Thus, in column (2) of the table, we re-estimate the model of column (1) introducing also 
country specific deterministic trends. The trend coefficients are statistically significant 
(L2(11)=49), though it should be said that much of the explanatory power of the trends comes 
from Germany. In terms of the rest of the estimates, the introduction of country specific 
trends changes somewhat the short term dynamics and the long run elasticities (which are 
now conditional on the trends). Qualitatively, however, previous results change little. The 
statistical significance of the coefficients in the long run relation does change, however, and 
 
6 Hassler (1999) shows that a significant time trend may indicate omission of a variable with a linear trend in 
mean from the cointegrating regression. In this respect, the inclusion of trends may help to hint at miss-
specification.    
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we can now reject the hypothesis that the long run effect of interest rates is zero. The 
coefficient of the population term, on the other hand, turns out to be statistically insignificant. 
Evidently, the trend variables capture some of the effect of the population term. Finally, even 
with trend variables we reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 10% level.  
We consider next amending the financial side of the model. Hence, we depart from the 
standard “Jorgenson” type of model and introduce two extra financial variables, the mortgage 
debt per capita and the stock market index (both in real terms). Mortgage debt reflects the 
external financial constraints faced by households and, as discussed above, is expected to be 
related mainly with the short term house price dynamics. Similarly, stock market prices affect 
the households’ wealth, and thus the availability of internal financing, but could also capture 
expectations about the future.7 Mortgage debt not only captures supply side conditions on the 
mortgage market but also changes in the demand for credit. We use, therefore, the lagged 
value of mortgage debt growth as instrument.8
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 present respectively the amended model without and with the 
trend variables. In both cases, the introduction of the two financial variables improves 
significantly the explanatory power of the model. Autocorrelation tests also improve.  
The estimated coefficients confirm the positive relation of house prices with both mortgage 
debt and stock prices in the short run. Quantitatively, the short run effect of stock market 
prices on house prices is relatively small. This is not surprising given the presumambly small 
share of equity in the typical household portfolio in our sample. Instead, the role of mortgage 
financing is quantitatively important. A 1% rise in mortgage debt is related to roughly 0.5%-
0.6% short run increase in house prices, ceteris paribus. The rest of the short run coefficients 
also change with the introduction of the two financial variables. Most noteworthy is the drop 
in the coefficient estimates for the lagged dependent variable and of income in the short run. 
In other words, part of what appeared previously as “persistence” in house price dynamics or 
as an income effect, is now explained as an effect on house prices from changes in credit 
availability. The estimated impulse effect of interest rates also falls somewhat below -0.4.  
 
7 Stock market prices could also capture the opportunity cost of investing in housing (to the extent that housing 
is treated as a normal portfolio decision by households). In this latter case, there could be a negative relation 
between changes in real house prices and in real stock prices. 
8 We also experimented with a number of additional instruments like the lagged change in long run interest rate, 
the lagged real disposable income growth and the lagged change in private debt per capita though, in practice, 
these made relatively little difference to the results. Note also that we lose 34 observations due to the 
unavailability of mortgage debt data. Re-estimating the model in columns (1) and (2) with the smaller data set 
leaves most of the results unchanged.  
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In the long run, stock market prices turn out not to be statistically significant, while mortgage 
debt is estimated to have a relatively moderate but persistently positive effect on real house 
prices (long run elasticity of about 0.2-0.3). When dropping mortgage debt from the long run 
relation, the long run semi elasticity of house prices with respect to interest rates rises by 
about 0.5 in both models (while that of income and the other variables remains largely 
unchanged). Mortgage interest rates and mortgage debt would seem to capture in part the 
same long run effect of “financial conditions” on house prices.  
The long run elasticity with respect to income rises in this model close to 1.5. In contrast, the 
long run effect of population, capital stock and construction costs turn out to be statistically 
insignificant in both models. This does not necessarily mean that all of these factors have not 
played a role for long run house price developments. Capital stock and, to certain extent, 
population have little variation year by year and this makes it difficult to get reliable 
estimates of their long run effect. Despite this, in some of the specifications population 
dynamics seem to play a role for long term house price developments. On the other hand, the 
statistical insignificance of construction costs and capital stock may also indicate that the 
main supply side factor may have been land availability (and cost), rather than the availability 
and construction cost of the buildings.9 Whatever the case may be, we find that we can drop 
the population and supply side variables from the long run relation with little effect on the 
rest of the estimation coefficients and this is what we do in the rest of the empirical 
investigation. 
Summarising so far, we can say that there is a strong case for amending the standard 
(“Jorgenson type”) house price model by introducing mortgage debt (and stock prices). Short 
term house price dynamics, in particular, seem to have been driven by financial factors 
(interest rates, mortgage debt, stock market prices), as well as by variations in income and 
construction costs. Point estimates vary somewhat from specification to specification, but 
qualitatively the results are robust to changes in the model. In the long run, we find that 
income has been the main driving factor. The long run elasticity of house prices with respect 
to income is estimated between 1 and 1.5. The estimated semi-elasticity of house prices with 
respect to interest rates is relatively low, somewhere between -1 and -2, with respect to 
mortgage debt is around 0.3. Country-specific deterministic trends could be capturing omitted 
 
9 Having said that, it is possible that construction bottlenecks could have caused temporary increases of costs 
and prices, as the short run construction cost coefficient suggests. The (rather poor) information available on 
land prices suggests that these have tended to increased much faster over the long run both compared to house 
prices and, even more so, compared to construction costs (see ECB, 2003).  
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variables in the long run relation, possibly related to supply and demographics. The 
“preferred”, more concise model (without and with trends) is presented in the first two 
columns of Table 4. The same comments apply as above. The rest of Table 4 shows some 
variations of the “preferred” model. In column 3, we re-estimate the model (with the trends) 
lagging the mortgage debt instruments by two periods to ensure that we are not capturing any 
feedback from house prices to mortgage debt. The estimate of the impulse effect of debt is 
always statistically significant and quantitatively important, albeit somewhat lower 
(compared to that in column (2)). All the remaining short and long dynamics are similar, 
though the “persistence” coefficient (of the lagged dependent variable) rises again to 0.5. 
This interaction between the short term house price dynamics attributable to changes in the 
mortgage debt and the “persistence” in house price inflation is of some interest as will be 
seen in the next section.    
In column 4 we estimate the model allowing for heterogeneous dynamics in the different 
countries. In particular, the short run terms are country specific, while we pool the long term 
coefficients. The main difference in these estimates compared to our preferred model in 
column (2) concerns the effect of the mortgage interest rate. The new coefficient estimates 
suggest that, in the short run, the negative effect of mortgage interest rates may be smaller, 
but the long run elasticity is actually higher. Other than that, the point estimates, particular in 
the long run, remain relatively stable, though the coefficient associated with the real 
mortgage debt turns out to be statistically insignificant in the long run. The average across 
countries of the individual short term factors are also similar to the pooled models. This 
model, however, seems to suffer serious problems of autocorrelation.10 
A further point should be briefly mentioned here. With the introduction of the debt and stock 
market variables, the coefficients of time trends become negative for all countries and in all 
variations of the basic model with few country-specific exceptions. In other words, once we 
take into account the changes in debt and stock market prices, it appears as if real house 
prices have risen less than what would have been expected. One possible interpretation of this 
is that the combined long term effect of housing supply and demographics (two variables 
meant to be captured by the country-specific trends) has been to depress house price growth. 
 
10 In preliminary analysis, we re-estimate the model (with trends) using FGLS, taking account of period-specific 
heteroscedasticity. As mentioned earlier, noise in data appears to be much higher in early periods, possibly 
because of measurement errors. With FGLS point estimates change somewhat, but results remain on the whole 
very much the same. Standard errors decrease for all coefficients.  
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While this is an interesting hypothesis, testing it goes beyond the scope of this paper and we 
leave it for future research (and better supply data). 
 
5. Possible Effects of Financial Liberation  
So far, we have followed much of the existing empirical literature and assumed that the house 
price relation has remained stable over time. One of the most obvious reasons why this may 
not have been the case is the liberalisation of the financial system. The literature has 
extensively documented a number of structural changes in the financial system in general and 
in the mortgage markets in particular, over our observation period. Though changes have 
varied in form and in timing, there has been something of a common pattern in most EU 
countries. This broadly involved a move away from interest rate caps and quantitative 
constraints in the late seventies and eighties, a relaxation of the rules on the specialisation of 
credit institutions and a gradual deregulation of the mortgage markets mostly in the eighties 
and early nineties and, more recently, measures aimed at promoting consumer protection and 
mortgage debt securitisation. In some countries, there has also been a parallel move towards 
bank privatisation and a related market restructuring as well as a reduction of state 
activities/direct subsidies in promoting owner occupation, though often a strong bias towards 
owner occupation and mortgage credit remained (or was even strengthened) in the tax system 
(IMF (2000) and ECB (2003)). 
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to time more precisely these changes or to find one or more 
indicators that could measure mortgage market “liberalisation” in different countries over a 
longer period of time. Most of the indicators we could think of either concerned one specific 
aspect of the market – indeed often they were market outcomes - that may or may not have 
been the result of “liberalisation” (e.g. loan-to-value ratios) or were unreliably measured over 
a longer period of time (e.g. mortgage market concentration or penetration) or both. A first 
attempt to estimate the direct short run effect of liberalisation measures using dummy 
variables has given poor results. In particular, making use of the information on mortgage 
market deregulation reported in ECB (2003) and in Lacat and Mesonnier (2005), we 
identified the dates of the main financial liberalisation measures in each country (see Annex 
2) and based on that we constructed a dummy which takes the value of 1 in the year such 
measures were implemented, and 0 otherwise. A second dummy was assigned a value of 1 
after the major measure was applied, and 0 otherwise. The idea was that, even if we had 
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missed some measures, we would have captured enough points in time to have an idea of the 
permanent or temporary effects of liberalisation measures. We introduced the two dummies 
in the preferred model of columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. As it turned out, both have a 
quantitatively small impact and are statistically insignificant. Varying somewhat the time 
frame (e.g. introducing dummies with a lag compared to a liberalisation measure and/or 
allowing each dummy to cover more than one year) did not provide any more interesting 
results. In all of the regressions, the rest of the estimated coefficients were unaffected by the 
introduction of these dummies. 
Clearly, one of the biggest problems with such an exercise is that of the correct dating of 
“liberalisation measures”, assuming a single date does indeed exists. More likely, regulatory 
and other changes in the mortgage market have taken longer periods to complete and had 
gradual effects on market practices. Moreover, in view of what was said earlier, there is no 
reason to believe that such changes can be captured by a shift in the intercept of the house 
price model, with no effects on the rest of the relation between financial variables and house 
prices. As argued earlier, financial liberalisation would have changed the marginal cost of 
finance and should have primarily affected short term dynamics of the house price relation. 
Though it is not a formal test of this hypothesis, we may look at different sub-periods of our 
sample and check whether estimated changes in coefficients are consistent with what the 
literature on mortgage markets would suggest should have happened. Clearly, we can not 
exclude that any changes in short term dynamics and/or long term elasticities of the house 
price equation could have been the product of other structural changes, more or less common 
to all European countries. In Table 5, we rerun the “preferred” model (of column 1 and 2, 
Table 4) allowing the coefficients of all independent variables to change from 1990 onwards. 
The year 1990 is arbitrarily chosen as a possible “break point” because it divides our sample 
roughly half way. A priori, 1990 is not a bad choice since many countries completed 
important steps of their financial liberalisation programmes around that time.  
Columns 1 of Table 5 present the model without trends, with the estimated coefficients for 
the period before and after 1990. Columns 2 are respectively the pre-1990 and post-1990 
estimated coefficients from the model with trends. Clearly, these models are over-
parameterised, containing as they do, apart from trends, 11 fixed effects and 2x10 
independent variables. Point estimates should therefore be considered with caution, though 
the direction of change of these coefficients before and after 1990 is potentially of interest. 
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The estimates suggest that short term house price dynamics have changed. Though there are 
some differences in the estimated parameters of the two models, with and without trends, the 
essential message is the same: The most important changes observed in the estimated 
parameters after 1990 are the drop of the income impulse effect (from about 0.5 to about 0.1) 
and that of debt (from 0.7 to about 0.1) and the corresponding increase of the short run effect 
of an interest rate change (from about -0.4 to about -0.6) and the coefficient of lagged 
dependent variable from below 0.4 to about 0.6). 11 
One way of describing the changes observed in the short term dynamics is that pricing of 
housing assets has become more akin to that of financial assets, i.e. their demand being more 
influenced by interest rates and past capital gains (feeding through expectations) and less so 
by household income and quantitative financial constraints. The apparent “de-linking” of 
house prices from income developments has been an issue of some speculation recently, 
when house prices continued to grow strongly in a number of EU countries even during the 
downturn in economic activity of the last few years of our sample. This was generally 
attributed to the changes in the financial system that should have made it easier for 
households to access external finance for a given (current) income and given availability of 
own-capital.12 Similarly, the higher impulse effect of interest rates on house prices is along 
the lines of the argument put forward by Iacoviello and Minetti (2003) on the possible effects 
of financial liberalisation on the impact of interest rate shocks on house prices. To our 
knowledge, the reduction of the impulse effect of quantitative credit variables on house prices 
has not been noted in the literature, though one could rationalise this as a sign of credit 
constraints becoming less binding. We return to the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable below. 
While these changes in the short term dynamics of house prices are the main focus here, it is 
interesting to note that the empirical long run relation between house prices, income, interest 
rates and mortgage debt turns out to be relatively more stable between the two sub-periods of 
 
11 Though point estimates vary, the direction of changes in the estimated coefficients remains true when we 
move the “break year” or change methodology (e.g. drop the instruments). 
12 This argument is not uncontroversial. For instance Almeida et al (2006) and Lamont and Stein (1999) find 
that the sensitivity of housing prices to household income changes is positively related to a relaxation of 
financial constraints. Following the former, we also interact the change in per capita real disposable income with 
the maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios which they use as proxy for financial liberalization. Results (not 
shown here but available upon request) show that the interaction term is statistically insignificant. This may be 
due to the different country sample which in our case is much more homogeneous but also to the quality of their 
financial constraint index. 
Page 17 of 69
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
18
our sample.13 In particular, the estimated long run elasticity of prices with respect to income 
and with respect to debt remained stable. There is no indication of a long run “de-linking” of 
house prices and income. The semi-elasticity with respect to interest rates would seem to 
have changed somewhat, but given that this coefficient is not very accurately estimated, we 
cannot reject that also this has remained constant between the two sub periods.  
In Table 6 we reproduce the above results, this time using different “break points” for the 
various countries. In particular, we now split the sample for each country according to the 
“dates of financial liberalization” measures mentioned above (see Annex 2). This approach 
has the advantage of allowing for a “possible” country-specific break point, but at the same 
time it reduces the number of observations of the pre-liberalization period by 39 
observations.14 Most of the results outlined in Table 5 seem robust to this alternative splitting 
procedure. The only noticeable difference is that the impulse effect of mortgage debt remains 
in these models high also in the post-liberalisation period. Also, the short run effect of stock 
prices is now consistently more relevant in the latter period.   
In line with what was discussed in the first part of this paper, our tentative interpretation is 
that changes in financial structures had an impact primarily on short term dynamics, 
reducing, ceteris paribus, the marginal cost of mortgage debt. The short run elasticity of 
house prices with respect to interest rates increased as a result. While changes in financial 
structures led households to anticipate house purchases, their longer run plans were not too 
much influenced. Being able to borrow more and to borrow earlier in the life cycle can raise 
the speed with which households realise their housing plans. For example it can reduce the 
average age of first-time buyers, but in the longer run housing plans should not change much. 
Income growth remains the main factor affecting these plans in the long run.   
So far, we have considered the possible changes in the estimated coefficients pre- and post-
liberalisation using different break points (1990 or country specific) and different models 
(with or without trend variables). The natural question that follows is whether we should not 
 
13 A Wald test does not reject the hypothesis of constant long run coefficients (2(4)=3.3, 2(4)=1.5 in the two 
models respectively). This observation needs some qualification however. When the model is run separately for 
the sub periods, as is done below, we can observe some changes in the long run elasticities. In particular, it 
seems that at least in some specifications the long run elasticity with respect to income rises in more recent 
times, though it is more difficult then to directly compare point estimates from different models. Concerning the 
short run relation, we can reject the hypothesis of constant coefficients at 10% level in the model without trends 
(2(6)=10.5), but not in the model with trends (2(6)=7.9), presumably because of the over-parametrisation of 
the latter. 
14 According ECB (2003) and Lacat and Mesonnier (2005), Germany had already introduced the major 
mortgage reforms in the 1960s. Therefore, the reduction of observations is mostly due to the exclusion of 
Germany from the pre-liberalization period. 
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allow also the error structure to vary from one sub-period to another, given that, as mentioned 
earlier, measurement and other errors may have also changed over the 35 years we are 
considering. Thus, in Table 7 we re-estimate the model separately for the two sub-periods, 
using both the common break point of 1990 (columns 1 and 2), and the country-specific 
break point based on the financial liberalization dummy (columns 3 and 4). Given the short 
time frame of each sub-period (and the reduced degrees of freedom), we comment only on 
the regressions without time trends. It should be said, however, that the absence of time 
trends makes adjustment to the long run appear much slower. Additionally, given the stability 
of the long run coefficients, for both sub-sample we include the same error correction term 
(ECT), which apart from house prices, includes income, mortgage interest rates and mortgage 
debt. We fix the respective elasticities at 1.1, -2.3 and 0.3, which are the long run coefficients 
estimated imposing the same cointegrating relationship for the two sub-periods. The 
correspondent long run elasticities for the models with country-specific break points are 1, -
1.6 and 0.2. Concerning the short term dynamics, we keep the same specification as in Table 
7 and Table 6.15 
These regressions do not impose the same error structure and the same country fixed effects 
in the two sub periods, unlike the models in Table 5 and Table 6. Nevertheless, the qualitative 
results are very similar to those of Tables 5 and 6. One can see again that the factors entering 
the house price short term dynamics seem have changed over time, with financial “price” 
variables (interest rate and to lesser extent share prices) being more important in recent years 
than was the case before 1990. Instead, the impulse effect of income and debt turn out to be 
statistically non significant (and quantitatively smaller) in the more recent period.  
Figure 1 provides an illustration of how short run house price dynamics may have changed 
over time. The charts show the estimated coefficients of the short term dynamics estimated 
with rolling regressions using a 15-year window. The specification is the same as that used in 
Table 7 (columns (1) and (2) for the ECM). Although the wide confidence bands point to 
high degree of uncertainty around the point estimates, the rolling coefficients are consistent 
with a gradual transition from the pre- to the post-liberalization period. The clearest changes 
seem to be the drop of the impulse effect of mortgage debt and an increase in the 
“persistence” factor (the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable). There seems to be also 
 
15 We have also tested for richer short term variables, including DRMRATE, DRDIPC(-1), DRCOST(-1), but 
they all turn out to be statistically insignificant. The shorter time periods and the fewer degrees of freedom do 
not allow for that much further experimentation.  
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a gradual change in the impulse effect of income, mortgage interest rates and share prices 
along the lines mentioned earlier.  
Finally, the increase of the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in the post-
liberalisation period warrants some further comments. We interpret this as a sign that in a 
world where households can enter/exit the mortgage and housing markets more easily and 
manage their portfolios, including their housing assets, more actively, house buying/selling 
decisions may more often be made with an eye to capital gains, than was the case in the past. 
If there are extrapolative elements in households’ expectations, recent house price 
movements may feed more strongly into current housing demand decisions. This 
interpretation is not the only one, but seems a plausible one and finds some support in the 
literature. Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) argued, in particular, that such behaviour could 
give rise to “frenzies” if there is a large number of speculative traders in the market. 
Following an earlier suggestion of Hendry (1984), they introduced a cubic function of the 
lagged house price increases to capture possible non-linearities due to such “frenzy” effects 
and found this to add to the explanatory power of their model.  
Following a similar approach, we find no evidence of “frenzies” in the sense used by 
Muellbauer and Murphy, but we do find evidence of a more complex dynamic adjustment in 
house prices in recent years (results are available from the authors). In particular, when 
entering the second lag of the dependent variable in both linear and cubic form, they both 
turn out statistically significant in the more recent period but with opposite signs (the 
coefficient of the cubic term is negative). Taking the point estimates literally, the model 
suggests that, for low house price increases/decreases, the effect of the cubic term roughly 
cancels out with the second lag of the dependent variable. For growth rates exceeding 15% 
(or below -15%), the overall effect becomes increasingly negative (positive). In other words, 
while house price increases tend to be followed (ceteris paribus) by further increases in the 
two next years, extreme movements of house prices in one year tend to be followed by a 
deceleration effect two years later. This could be a sign of a more complex household 
expectation mechanism (which interprets extreme movements as “bubbles”) but it could also 
be for instance the result of supply catching up with demand shocks. The question of whether 
changes in the housing and mortgage markets have actually altered the way households make 
decisions about housing and form their expectations of house prices is an interesting one and 
probably warrants more research.  
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6. Conclusions 
The relation between financial factors and house price dynamics has been in the limelight in 
recent years. As suggested by the discussion in the first section of this paper, the observed 
interest rate channel is probably one part of this relation. Factors affecting the marginal 
effective cost of mortgage debt, often not fully captured by the “posted” interest rates, can 
have a significant influence on housing demand, particularly for what concerns short term 
dynamics. In the absence of a better measure of these factors, we have used (mortgage) debt 
as a proxy, in line with much of the rest of the literature.  
Relying on a standard one-equation reduced form model, expanded to include supply side 
variables and deterministic country-specific time trends, we find that, alongside with income 
and construction costs, (lagged) interest rates, mortgage debt and, to lesser degree, stock 
market developments have had a significant impact on short term house price dynamics in 
our sample of EU countries since the early 1970s. In the long run, the elasticity of (real) 
house prices with respect to (real) income is found to lie between 0.9 and 1.5, the semi-
elasticity with respect to interest rates between -1.2 and –2.6. Mortgage debt seems also to 
enter in the long run relation, albeit with a relatively low elasticity (around 0.3).  
When we split our sample to check for possible effects of financial liberalisation, we find that 
the relation between financial factors and house price dynamics is much more complex and 
less stable than what the initial models would seem to suggest (I suggest rephrasing this 
sentence given that the changes are often insignificant). The changes between the two sub-
periods concern mainly short term dynamics and in general they are consistent with what one 
would expect the likely effect of financial liberalisation have been on house price dynamics. 
In particular, the impulse effect on house prices of income and mortgage debt has become 
smaller, while that of interest rates, past increases of house prices and, to lesser degree, stock 
market has strengthened. We could not find a clear cut pattern as far as the construction costs 
were concerned. In other words, there seems to have been a certain “de-linking” of short term 
house price dynamics from “real” income accompanied with a certain change whereby the 
housing market may have become more similar to a financial market, with interest rates and 
expectations of capital gains playing a more prominent role. From a policy point of view, it is 
also interesting to note that we find little evidence of important changes over time in the long 
run relation. In particular, the long run elasticity of house prices with respect to income, 
interest rates and debt would not seem to have changed significantly over the two sub-periods 
we consider.  
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In conclusion, we think the question of whether changes in financial structures have affected 
house price dynamics and, in particular, whether the more favourable credit conditions have 
affected primarily the short term house price dynamics warrant further investigation. This 
paper puts an argument why this may be the case and provides some tentative results that 
support this hypothesis. Future research will probably need more reliable information on how 
credit standards may have changed over time as a result of structural changes in the mortgage 
markets and how these affected house price dynamics. 
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Annex 1: Theoretical model 
To illustrate the point made in the text concerning short and long run effects of financial 
factors on housing demand, consider the following stylised dynamic optimisation model:  
(1)  max 
0
( )rte u c f dt
+
 +
The household plans housing investment and debt at time t=0 so as to maximise (1). This 
plan may be changed (“re-optimised”) as time progresses and new information becomes 
available.16 In (1), u is the household’s utility function (u’>0, u’’<0), c is the (real) 
consumption of goods and services (other than housing services) and f is the consumption of 
housing services from a housing stock H (f’(H)>0, f’’(H);0). Finally, r is the opportunity cost 
(the going market interest rate). 17 
Next, we write the income identity of the household as follows: 
 (2) c y mD qI D
•
=   +
In words, consumption each period is equal to current (non-interest) income, y, minus interest 
paid on (net) debt and minus the “own capital” investment in housing. Net interest paid is 
expressed as mD, where D is the net debt outstanding (when negative these are the net 
outstanding financial assets) and m is the effective average interest rate paid (received) by the 
household. The gross investment in housing is qI (q is the current price of a unit of housing 
stock in terms of consumption goods) and D
•
is the change in net debt. Finally, housing 
assets change according to the following equation of motion, where < is the physical 
depreciation of housing capital. 
(3) H
•
=I-<H
So far the model is relatively standard. We next introduce an upward slopping credit supply 
function, as mentioned in the main text. In particular, if d is the ratio of net debt over housing 
assets (D/qH), the cost of a unit of debt that the household has to pay is written as follows: 
 
16 This is the simplest (and possibly most realistic) optimisation strategy, where households do not try to make 
upfront an optimal plan for every possible eventuality (“state of the world”), but use instead their best prediction 
of future events to come up with a single plan, as if future events were certain. 
17 Current consumption and consumption of housing services are unrealistically assumed to be perfect 
substitutes in (1), but this is of little relevance in the context of the discussion here. ). For a special case of a 
utility function along the lines of (1), see Iacovello and Minetti (2003). A more realistic model of the 
consumption-housing decision would require a utility function with more than one arguments and considerably 
more notation.  See, for example, Ayuso and Restoy (2006). 
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(4) ( ,.)m r d d= +  for d> d
and  m = r for d; d
where   (0) = 0, ' W0, '' W0
In words, the unit cost of net debt is the going market interest rate, r, so long as the debt-asset 
ratio is below some threshold, d

.18 Beyond this threshold, the household pays an individual 
risk premium,  , which may include both higher interest payments and non-interest rate 
costs of debt.19 The premium is an upward slopping function of the debt-asset ratio. It could 
be influenced also by other factors, such as income or various household characteristics. One 
may introduce also an upper credit constraint, somewhere around d=1, but for simplicity we 
will assume below that mortgage costs rise fast enough at the margin never to be optimal to 
hold too much debt.  
Thus, the path of housing capital and debt are chosen so as (1) is maximised subject to (2), 
(3) and (4) and excluding explosive paths (infinite bubbles). This dynamic optimisation 
model is somewhat more complex than usual because it involves two control variables 
(housing investment and net new debt) and the corresponding two state variables. A detailed 
description of optimisation models of this type can be found in the literature, an early 
example is Steigum (1983). We do not expand on the formal details (available from the 
authors), but concentrate on the couple of points made in the main text.    
Substituting the marginal utility out of the Euler equations (not shown here), we may derive 
the following condition that holds throughout the planned optimal path of housing investment 
and debt: 
(5)  ' ( ' (1 ))f q m m d d q
•
= + +  
In words, along the planned optimal path, the marginal return to housing capital (lhs of (5) is 
equal to what we may call the marginal user cost of capital (rhs of (5)). The latter includes 
the usual depreciation and capital gains terms but differs from the common user cost of 
capital formulas in that it includes the marginal financial cost of debt. In particular, the last 
 
18 One can easily extend this model to include the possibility that the basic mortgage rate is not equal to the 
opportunity cost of the household (the discount factor in (1)), for example because of tax deductibility of 
mortgage interest payments. For simplicity, we do not consider this case here (but see comment below). 
19 To avoid issues of discontinuity at  d d

= , one also needs to assume that (0, ) 0+  =
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term in the parenthesis captures the marginal cost when the interest premium changes 
because of the debt/capital ratio changing.  
Chart 1 below, provides an illustration of the optimal plan of household indebtedness. For 
simplicity, the individual risk premium function A(.) is taken to be quadratic and the relative 
price of capital, q, is normalised to 1 (thus there are no capital gains to be made).20 The 
horizontal axis shows the debt-asset ratio of the household, the vertical shows the marginal 
return and the marginal user cost of housing capital. The marginal return is represented by the 
horizontal line f’(H) which shifts down as capital increases if there are diminishing marginal 
returns to housing capital. The kinked line OCB represents the marginal user cost of capital 
that rises after the debt-asset ratio exceeds a threshold, set here to be 0.5. 
Chart: Optimal financial plan of the household 
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Suppose the household starts with a relatively low debt-asset ratio (below 0.5) and few 
housing assets (H1). The marginal user cost of capital is, at point C, much lower than the 
marginal return at f’(H1) (point A). Thus, the optimal plan will entail an initial large increase 
in debt and corresponding increase in housing capital, say from H1 to H2. The new short run 
optimum will be at point B where marginal return and marginal cost meet. Thereafter, and 
along the entire optimal plan, the household will use some of its savings to make incremental 
 
20 As an illustration, we set the (real) going market rate to 2% and the housing depreciation to 4%. The 
coefficient of the quadratic risk function is set to 0.2. 
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housing investments while at the same time reducing its debt-asset ratio. Both the marginal 
return of housing assets and the marginal cost of debt will be falling along this path. This 
optimal plan is depicted in the chart by the movement from B towards C. Throughout this 
path, the optimality condition (5) holds (i.e. the dotted line shifts down as H increases tracing 
the BC line). According to this optimal plan, in the longer run, the household will bring down 
its debt level to a “safety” region where it will not have to pay an additional risk premium.  In 
the above Chart, in the long run,  f’(H), reaches the OC line. The optimal debt-equity ratio is 
anywhere between O and C, i.e. between 0 and 50% in our example and the risk premium 
paid on debt by the household over and above the going market rate is zero. and the 
optimality condition (5) simplifies to the following (long run) condition, familiar from the 
“Jorgenson” type of models: 
(6)   '( ) ( )ef H q r q= +  &
where He is the planned long run optimum capital.  
Note that this is not the only possible path a household may choose. If, for example, there are 
no diminishing returns to housing capital, the household will have an incentive to continue to 
direct all its savings to housing investment, instead of repaying its debt. The f’(H) line does 
not fall in this case as H increases and the optimal plan is for a debt-asset ratio corresponding 
at point B of that Chart both in the short and in the long run. The household will plan to 
continue paying an “individual” risk premium throughout the planning horizon. Other 
variations of the model, for example allowing the minimum lending rate (paid by the more 
creditworthy households) to be below their opportunity cost (e.g. because of tax deductibility 
of mortgage interest payments) can give intermediate results, i.e. the planned long run debt-
asset ratio could be somewhere between C and D.  
There are three points this stylised model helps to illustrate. 
First, conceptually one may distinguish between two components in household financial 
costs. One component is dependent on the current financial situation of the household (the 
“individual risk premium”) and one is linked to market conditions irrespectively of the 
“identity” of the household (the “going” interest rate). Even though in practice it is not 
always easy to say the one from the other in the more complex multi-year mortgage contracts, 
the important issue identified in the model above is that the individual risk premium is likely 
to be rising with household indebtedness at least beyond some threshold. This will give rise 
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to an upward slopping credit supply curve for the individual household. Credit constraints 
may be thought of as a special case where the supply curve becomes perfectly inelastic.  
Second, because the individual risk premium is rising at the margin, it will affect the ability 
of households to smooth wealth over time and, thus, also it will affect the speed with which 
the household can accumulate housing capital. In the above chart, for example, for a given 
market interest rate, a more elastic supply of credit (less steeply sloped CB line) would have 
meant that the household would find it advantageous to initially take out more debt and 
accumulate more housing capital (the point B would be more to the “south-east”). In other 
words, the fact that credit institutions use the current indebtedness of households to allocate 
and price loans means that households generally have an incentive (or face a constraint) to 
take out only as much debt as their wealth will allow if they wish not to pay too high premia. 
This limits also their ability to spend on housing at any moment in time. If the credit criteria 
change (e.g. credit conditions are relaxed), households may have an incentive to anticipate or 
postpone their planned housing investment, even if the market interest rate and their income 
has not changed. 
Third, the model suggests that while a change in credit conditions is likely to have a 
significant impact on the timing of investment and debt, as mentioned above, the longer run 
plan of a household may or may not be affected by the shape of the credit supply function. In 
the example given above, the household faces in the long run a perfectly elastic supply of 
credit (the OC line). As a result, the planned long run optimum capital He in (6) does not 
depend at all on the shape of the individual risk premium function (A(.)), though it depends on 
the market interest rate.  
The rationale for this last result is that, over the longer run, the household will be able to 
accumulate own capital and thus improve its financial standing, bringing down the individual 
risk premium that it has to pay. As mentioned above, whether the household will indeed plan 
to bring down its indebtedness depends also on the marginal return of housing and other 
assets. Nevertheless the example illustrates the point that, over the longer run, households 
may plan to accumulate own wealth which can ease the financial constraints they face in the 
short run and be faced with a more elastic credit supply. A change in financial constraints or 
on the individual risk premium charged by credit institutions is likely therefore to have a 
dying out effect on the demand of housing assets of individual households. Financial flow 
constraints  and/or individual risk premia of the type described above act as costs of 
adjustment from one level of housing demand to another. 
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Annex 2: Data 
Data was collected from various international and national sources. Typically, one or two 
main sources covering more than one country were used for each variable, filling gaps, 
particularly in earlier periods, from national sources. Only when not possible to find the 
required missing data from national sources, did we resort to linking series after checking the 
overlapping periods. One may find more information on these sources and data limitations in 
ECB (2003), where a large part of the same data set was used. We list below the main sources 
variable by variable and, in the case of house prices, country by country.  
The following country abbreviations are used: BE for Belgium, DK for Denmark, DE for 
unified Germany, WG for previous West Germany, IE for Ireland, ES for Spain, FR for 
France, IT for Italy NL for Netherlands, FI for Finland, SE for Sweden and UK for United 
Kingdom. 
The following abbreviations of sources are used: Ameco: European Commission Ameco 
database; BIS: Bank of International Settlements, ECB/ESCB: European Central Bank and 
European System of Central Banks (including individual National Central Bank data); 
ESA95: European System of Accounts 95; HS: National Agency for Entreprise and Housing, 
Denmark (see references); IFS: IMF International Financial Statistics; NSI: National 
Statistical Institute; MEI: OECD Main economic indicators; OEO: OECD Economic Outlook   
Nominal House Prices (HP)
BE: BIS (based on real estate sector data)  
DK: NSI 
WG (DE):  ECB/ESCB (based on real estate sector data) refers only to regions in ex-West 
Germany  
IE: BIS, ECB/ESCB (based on data from the Department of Environment and Local 
Government)  
ES: Ministry of Housing – prior to 1988 refers only to Madrid 
FR: ECB/ESCB, National Sources (FNAIM and ECLN)  
IT: ECB/ESCB (based on real estate sector data) - main cities. 
NL: ECB/ESCB, Land Registry Office  
FI: NSI 
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SE: NSI  
UK: Real estate sector data  
RHP is constructed deflating the nominal house price with the consumer price deflator (see 
below)   
Consumer price deflator
Sources: Eurostat, ECB/ESCB, BIS. For Euro-area countries, we used HICP data, linked 
backwards to CPI, excluding the owner-occupied component. For DK, SE and UK we used 
CPI data. An alternative deflator based on the GDP deflator was also tried and led to 
practically the same results. 
Nominal disposable income 
Sources: OEO, Ameco and national sources. For Germany, data from regions in ex-West 
Germany was used. The real disposable income per capita (RDIPC) is constructed using the 
consumer price deflator and the total population aver 24 years of age.  
Nominal mortgage interest rates
Sources: ECB/ESCB, BIS and national sources. For some countries, mortgage interest rates 
are not available for the 1970s. We have therefore linked the existing mortgage interest rate 
series with series on long term interest rates. The real mortgage interest rate (RMRATE) is 
constructed as the difference between the nominal mortgage rate and the ex-post inflation rate 
based on the consumer price deflator.  
Long term interest rates
Sources: ESCB/IO, OEO, MEI, BIS. The basic definition refers to 10 year government bonds 
or the closest series we could find. For Spain from 1977 backwards we linked with the 
deposit short term interest rate. The real long term interest rate (RLRATE) is constructed as 
the difference between the nominal long term interest rate and the ex-post inflation rate based 
on the consumer price deflator.  
Mortgage debt
Sources: ECB/ESCB, BIS, national sources. We use as main definition the end of period 
outstanding loans to households for house purposes. For missing data, we use the BIS 
“credits for domestic residential construction” data and also national source data with the 
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closest possible definition. The real stock of mortgage debt per capita (RMDEBT) is 
constructed using the consumer price deflator and the total population aver 24 years of age. 
Population statistics
Source: Eurostat. Data for Germany refers to the regions of ex-West Germany. POP is the 
total population above 24 years of age.  
Housing Stock
The residential housing stock (HSTOCK) is calculated with the perpetual inventory method 
using residential investment data from ESA 95 and OEO. Information on number of dwellings 
per country (Housing Statistics of the European Union, 2002) was used in order to calculate 
the “benchmark” (or initial) capital for each country. This was done comparing the change in 
the actual number of dwelling over a certain period and the residential investment over the 
same period (details available from the authors). We imposed 2% annual depreciation, but 
checked that small variations to this rate made no difference to the results. For Germany, we 
used data from ex-West Germany. 
Construction costs
Various national sources, ESA 95, OEO. Where not available, the residential investment 
deflators were used instead (linked when necessary to the rest of the construction cost data). 
The alternative, of using throughout the residential investment deflators was tried and 
produced practically the same results. Real construction costs (RCOST) is calculated using 
consumer price deflator. 
Stock exchange price index
BIS, IFS. The real stock price index (RSP) is constructed using the consumer price deflator.  
Dates of Mortgage market measures according to ECB (2003) and Lacat and Messonier 
(2005).
Belgium (1977, 1995), Denmark (1982), Finland (1986, 1987), France (1987), Germany 
(1967), Ireland (1985), Italy (1983, 1988), Netherlands (1980, 1992), Spain (1987), Sweden 
(1985) and the U.K. (1980, 1986). 
The ‘financial liberalization’ period of Tables 8 and 9 is based on the date of the latest 
mortgage market measure.   
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Table 1 Panel Unit Root Tests  
 
RHP RDIPC RMRATE HSTOCK POP RSP RMDEBT RCOST 
Level  
No trends  
LLC  2.38 -1.47 0.69 3.26 -6.05** 1.18 2.68 -1.24 
IPS  1.24 1.44 0.03 -1.41 0.10 1.25 5.87 -0.42 
With trends  
LLC  2.56 -0.93 2.17 -1.32 2.28 -0.88 -1.30 -0.96 
IPS  -1.18 -0.96 3.46 1.56 4.17 -1.23 -0.57 -0.50 
First  
difference 
 
LLC -4.84** -7.19** -10.72** -2.35** -0.92 -8.49** -0.87 -7.10** 
IPS -5.32** -7.53** -12.20** -0.91 -1.77** -9.12** -2.97** -7.81** 
Notes: LLC stands for the Levin, Lin and Chu tests in which it is assumed that there is a common unit root process. 
IPS stands for the panel integration tests are based on Im, Pesaran and Shin (2000). The lag order was set to 2 (1) 
for the unit root test in level (first difference). The tests are distributed asymptotically N(0,1) and are one-sided. (**) 
indicates the 5% significance level, which is based on the critical value -1.64 for all tests. 
 
Table 2  Pedroni Cointegration Tests  
 1 2 3 4 5
RHP 
RDIPC 
RMRATE 
POP 
HSTOCK 
RCOST 
RMDEBT 
RSP 
RHP 
RDIPC 
RMRATE 
POP 
HSTOCK 
RCOST 
RHP 
RDIPC 
RMRATE 
RMDEBT 
RSP 
RHP 
RDIPC 
RMRATE 
RMDEBT 
RHP 
RDIPC 
RMRATE 
No Trends No Trends No Trends No Trends No Trends 
Panel v -0.34 0.76 0.44 1.31 3.43** 
Panel  2.89 1.13 1.26 0.01 -1.69** 
Panel pp-t 0.10 -0.59 0.50 -0.55 -1.75** 
Panel t -0.29 0.31 0.82 -0.58 -1.59 
Group  3.51 2.07 2.08 1.00 -0.52 
Group pp-t -0.62 -0.33 0.85 0.06 -1.14 
Group t -1.72** 0.28 -0.18 -1.49 -1.97** 
With Trends With Trends With Trends With Trends With Trends 
Panel v 0.06 0.88 -0.15 0.20 1.96** 
Panel  3.62 1.53 2.55 1.64 -0.06 
Panel pp-t 0.02 -1.11 1.63 0.81 -0.74 
Panel t -0.86 -2.68** 2.27 1.10 -0.84 
Group  4.31 2.65 3.28 2.38 1.05 
Group pp-t -0.90 -0.53 1.90 1.31 -0.11 
Group t -2.77** -2.22** 1.00 0.30 -0.98 
Notes: The null hypothesis for all tests is ‘no cointegration relationship for all countries.’ The alternative for the 
four panel tests is ‘there is a cointegration relationship and the degree of autocorrelation of the residuals of the 
cointegration relationships is the same across the countries.’ The alternative for the three group statistics is that 
‘‘there is a cointegration relationship and the degree of autocorrelation of the residuals of the cointegration 
relationships may differ across countries.’ All tests are distributed asymptotically N(0,1) and are one-sided. (**) 
indicates the 5% significance level, which is based on the critical value -1.64 for all but the panel v-stat for which 
the upper side 1.64 value is used. See Pedroni (1999) for details. 
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Table 3 House Price Equation – Alternative Specifications  
1 2 3 4
DRHP(-1) 0.53*** 
(0.06) 
0.56*** 
(0.06) 
0.43*** 
(0.06) 
0.40*** 
(0.07) 
DRDIPC 0.58*** 
(0.14) 
0.54*** 
(0.15) 
0.39*** 
(0.13) 
0.36*** 
(0.14) 
DRMRATE(-1) -0.48*** 
(0.18) 
-0.42** 
(0.18) 
-0.36** 
(0.15) 
-0.38** 
(0.16) 
DRCOST 0.28*** 
(0.09) 
0.27*** 
(0.09) 
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
0.20*** 
(0.07) 
DRCOST(-1) -0.22** 
(0.09) 
-0.25*** 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
DRMDEBT  0.49*** 
(0.11) 
0.62*** 
(0.16) 
DRSP  0.04*** 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
RHP(-1) -0.13*** 
(0.02) 
-0.21*** 
(0.03) 
-0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.23*** 
(0.03) 
RDIPC(-1) 0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.35*** 
(0.09) 
RMRATE(-1) -0.17 
(0.12) 
-0.32* 
(0.14) 
-0.28*** 
(0.10) 
-0.24* 
(0.12) 
RMDEBT(-1)  0.03* 
(0.017) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
RSP(-1)  0.002 
(0.001) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
POP(-1) 0.37*** 
(0.12) 
0.44 
(0.29) 
-0.02 
(0.15) 
0.41 
(0.30) 
HSTOCK(-1) -0.18* 
(0.10) 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.17) 
RCOST(-1) 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
Long-Run  
Elasticities 
RDIPC 1.0 0.7 1.3 1.5 
RMRATE -1.3 -1.5 -1.9 -1.0 
RMDEBT 0.2 0.3 
RSP  0.01 0.4 
POP 2.8 2.1 -0.1 1.8 
HSTOCK -1.4 -0.9 -0.3 -0.5 
RCOST 0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.1 
Estimation Method OLS OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Country Trends no yes no yes 
R- squared 0.46 0.49 0.59 0.62 
Obs 358 358 334 334 
Autocorrelation 6.4 5.3 2.3 3.2 
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in brackets below the 
point estimates. * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% 
level. IV = instrumental variables. DRMDEBT is instrumented with DRMDEBT(-1). The serial correlation test is 
distributed as a 2 with 2 degrees of freedom and the 10% and 5% critical values are 4.61 and 5.99, respectively.   
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Table 4 House Price Equation: Robustness of ‘Preferred’ Specification 
1 2 3 4
DRHP(-1) 0.43*** 
(0.06) 
0.41*** 
(0.06) 
0.50*** 
(0.07) 
0.42 
DRDIPC 0.37*** 
(0.13) 
0.40*** 
(0.13) 
0.40*** 
(0.16) 
0.33 
DRMRATE(-1) -0.38** 
(0.15) 
-0.41*** 
(0.15) 
-0.41*** 
(0.15) 
-0.09 
DRCOST 0.23*** 
(0.07) 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
0.18 
DRMDEBT 0.47*** 
(0.09) 
0.59*** 
(0.12) 
0.41** 
(0.19) 
0.41 
DRSP 0.05*** 
(0.015) 
0.03** 
(0.014) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
RHP(-1) -0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.24*** 
(0.03) 
-0.24*** 
(0.03) 
-0.25*** 
(0.05) 
RDIPC(-1) 0.14*** 
(0.05) 
0.36*** 
(0.09) 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
0.37** 
(0.15) 
RMRATE(-1) -0.30*** 
(0.11) 
-0.27** 
(0.12) 
-0.33** 
(0.13) 
-0.66*** 
(0.23) 
RMDEBT(-1) 0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Long-Run  
Elasticities 
RDIPC 0.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 
RMRATE -2 -1.1 -1.4 -2.6 
RMDEBT 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Estimation Method IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-PMG 
Individual trends no yes yes yes 
R- squared 0.59 0.63 0.65 0.66 
Obs 334 334 329 334 
Autocorrelation 1.5 1.8 1.5 12.6 
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in brackets below the 
point estimates. * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% 
level. IV-2SLS = instrumental variables two stage least square. DRMDEBT is instrumented with DRMDEBT(-1).
The serial correlation test is distributed as a 2 with 2 degrees of freedom and the 10% and 5% critical values are 
4.61 and 5.99, respectively. The last column shows the results of the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) model with 
country-specific short-run dynamics, whose simple average is shown in italics. 
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Table 5 House Price Equation: Splitting the Sample Period 
1 2
Pre-1990 Post-1990 Pre-1990 Post-1990 
DRHP(-1) 0.37*** 
(0.08) 
0.63** 
(0.11) 
0.35*** 
(0.08) 
0.59* 
(0.12) 
DRDIPC 0.52** 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.20) 
0.48** 
(0.20) 
0.12 
(0.21 
DRMRATE(-1) -0.37** 
(0.18) 
-0.60** 
(0.28) 
-0.39** 
(0.19) 
-0.68* 
(0.37) 
DRCOST 0.25*** 
(0.08) 
0.18 
(0.15) 
0.25** 
(0.09) 
0.15 
(0.14 
DRMDEBT 0.64** 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.21) 
0.77*** 
(0.17) 
0.13 
(0.24 
DRSP 0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
RHP(-1) -0.17*** 
(0.03) 
-0.17*** 
(0.03) 
-0.24*** 
(0.03) 
-0.24*** 
(0.03) 
RDIPC(-1) 0.21*** 
(0.05) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
0.37*** 
(0.09) 
0.37*** 
(0.09) 
RMRATE(-1) -0.43** 
(0.15 
-0.46* 
(.28) 
-0.33* 
(0.17 
-0.64* 
(0.33) 
RMDEBT(-1) 0.06*** 
(0.017) 
0.05*** 
(0.017) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
Long-Run  
Elasticities 
RDIPC 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 
RMRATE -2.5 -2.7 -1.4 -2.7 
RMDEBT 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Estimation 
Method IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Individual trends no yes 
R- squared 0.59 0.61 
Obs 334 334 
Autocorrelation 2.1 3.2 
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in brackets below the 
point estimates. * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% 
level. IV-2SLS = instrumental variables two stage least square. DRMDEBT is instrumented with DRMDEBT(-1).
The serial correlation test is distributed as a 2 with 2 degrees of freedom and the 10% and 5% critical values are 
4.61 and 5.99, respectively.   
Page 35 of 69
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
36
Table 6 House Price Equation: Pre and Post Financial Liberalization (FL)  
1 2
Pre-FL Post-FL Pre-FL Post-FL 
DRHP(-1) 0.34*** 
(0.08) 
0.51*** 
(0.08) 
0.28*** 
(0.09) 
0.55*** 
(0.09) 
DRDIPC 0.79*** 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.16) 
0.69*** 
(0.22) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
DRMRATE(-1) -0.23 
(0.18) 
-0.41* 
(0.37) 
-0.19** 
(0.23) 
-0.60** 
(0.30) 
DRCOST 0.13 
(0.08) 
0.31** 
(0.13) 
0.19** 
(0.09) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
DRMDEBT 0.47*** 
(0.14) 
0.41** 
(0.17) 
0.71*** 
(0.20) 
0.42** 
(0.18) 
DRSP 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
RHP(-1) -0.17*** 
(0.03) 
-0.18*** 
(0.03) 
-0.26*** 
(0.04) 
-0.25*** 
(0.03) 
RDIPC(-1) 0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.39*** 
(0.09) 
0.39*** 
(0.09) 
RMRATE(-1) -0.43*** 
(0.15) 
-0.39* 
(0.25) 
-0.28* 
(0.17) 
-0.54** 
(0.26) 
RMDEBT(-1) 0.03** 
(0.015) 
0.02 
(0.015) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
Long-Run  
Elasticities 
RDIPC 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.5 
RMRATE -2.5 -2.2 -1.1 -2.2 
RMDEBT 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Estimation 
Method IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Individual trends no yes 
R- squared 0.61 0.64 
Obs 334 334 
Autocorrelation 0.6 1.1 
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in brackets below the 
point estimates. * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% 
level. IV-2SLS = instrumental variables two stage least square. DRMDEBT is instrumented with DRMDEBT(-1).
The serial correlation test is distributed as a 2 with 2 degrees of freedom and the 10% and 5% critical values are 
4.61 and 5.99, respectively.   
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Table 7 House Price Equation: Additional Results 
1 2 3 4
Pre-1990 Post-1990 Pre-FL Post-FL 
DRHP(-1) 0.36*** 
(0.09) 
0.59*** 
(0.10) 
0.31*** 
(0.10) 
0.49*** 
(0.09) 
DRDIPC 0.44** 
(0.21) 
0.08 
(0.15) 
0.62** 
(0.24) 
0.11 
(0.16) 
DRMRATE(-1) -0.37* 
(0.22) 
-0.58*** 
(0.21) 
-0.29 
(0.22) 
-0.42** 
(0.21) 
DRCOST 0.23** 
(0.10) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
0.30 
(0.14) 
DRMDEBT 0.71*** 
(0.18) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.73*** 
(0.22) 
0.39** 
(0.18) 
DRSP 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
ECM(-1) -0.20*** 
(0.04) 
-0.19*** 
(0.03) 
-0.31*** 
(0.05) 
-0.15*** 
(0.03) 
Estimation 
Method 
IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Individual trends No no no no 
R- squared 0.53 0.70 0.50 0.64 
Obs 169 165 130 204 
Autocorrelation 5.2 0.3 5.1 2.8 
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects. Het roskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in brackets below the 
point estimates. * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% 
level. IV-2SLS = instrumental variables two stage least square. DRMDEBT is instrumented with DRMDEBT(-1).
The serial correlation test is distributed as a 2 with 2 degrees of freedom and the 10% and 5% critical values are 
4.61 and 5.99, respectively.   
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Figure 1: Rolling Regressions: Short Run Coefficients of House Price Equation  
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Notes: Rolling regressions of preferred specification with imposed long run relationship as in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 9. The rolling window is fixed at T=15. The middle blue line is the point estimate of the correspondent 
coefficient. Confidence bands are based on ± 1.6 standard errors.     
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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of house prices in a sample of European countries 
over the period 1970-2004. Focusing on the role of financial liberalization, we find that it has 
mainly affected the short term dynamics of residential prices. In particular, the impulse 
effects on house prices of income and mortgage debt have become smaller. On the other hand 
the effects of interest rates, past house prices and, to a lesser degree, stock market have 
strengthened. In other words, there seems to have been a certain “de-linking” of short term 
house price dynamics from income, whereas the housing market may have become more 
similar to a financial asset market, with interest rates and expectations of capital gains 
playing a more prominent role.  
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I. Introduction 
Economic commentators have long attributed movements of housing prices to mortgage 
market conditions. Despite this widespread conviction, the empirical evidence on the 
importance of financial factors on house price dynamics is relatively thin and often difficult 
to interpret, especially when it comes to studies outside the U.S. and the U.K.  
The earlier country or multi-country studies of house price dynamics focused primarily on the 
interest rate channel (see for example Drake (1993), Kennedy and Andersen (1994), Englund 
and Ioannides (1997), Kasparova and White (2001), McGibany and Nourzad (2004)). For the 
most part, interest rates (or the user cost of capital) were found to have a statistically 
significant, though quantitatively limited impact on house prices. Other financial variables 
and, in particular bank credit, have also been introduced early on in country specific models, 
particularly for the U.K. (see for instance Hendry (1984) and Meen (1990)), typically, on the 
grounds that there may be credit rationing. A certain coincidence in recent years between 
credit cycles and house prices in countries other than just the U.K. has brought the possible 
relation between the two back into the limelight. Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), IMF (2004), 
Lecat and Mésonnier (2005), Ott (2006) and others have explored the role of bank credit in 
house price models covering several countries.  
In general, credit quantity variables in these studies turned out to be statistically significant, 
though, in many cases endogeneity may have been an issue of concern.1 The construction of 
alternative measures of “credit availability” or “excess liquidity”, apart from raising 
additional methodological and measurement issues, has not been empirically very successful. 
From the theoretical point of view, the lack often of a well defined conceptual framework that 
would explain the introduction of credit quantity variables in the empirical equation makes 
the interpretation of the results more difficult. Perhaps even more to the point, there seems to 
be a significant gap between, on the one hand, the theoretical discussions on structural 
changes in the mortgage markets and the financial system in general and, on the other, the 
little emphasis the empirical literature has placed in detecting any changes over time in the 
relation between house price dynamics and financial variables. Noticeable exceptions are 
provided by Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) who argue that financial liberalization of 
mortgage markets led to notable shifts in house price behaviour making real interest rates 
                                                 
1 Hofmann (2003) examined the two-way relationship of property prices and bank lending in a sample of 20 
countries. His evidence suggests that the long-run relationship runs from property prices to bank lending, while 
in the short run causality may be running both ways. See also Hofmann (2004). 
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 3
relatively more important. A similar argument has been made by Iacoviello and Minetti 
(2003) who have estimated that in Finland, Sweden and the U.K. the sensitivity of house 
prices to short term interest rates has increased over time, probably as a result of the process 
of financial deregulation. This issue received some attention also in IMF (2008). 
A brief digression to the conceptual framework underlying most empirical research on house 
prices may be useful at this point. Textbook analysis of housing decisions is typically based 
on simple assumptions about the financial side, namely that individual households face either 
a perfectly elastic or a perfectly inelastic supply of credit. The former is equivalent to the 
“Jorgenson” type of model in corporate investment. The perfectly inelastic credit supply 
(when debt or the debt-asset ratio exceeds a certain level) is instead the building block for the 
familiar financial accelerator models. Though not particularly realistic, both assumptions 
simplify considerably the modelling of household decisions and each provides an explanation 
for including either price (interest rate, user cost of capital) or credit quantity variables in 
empirical relationships. A more subtle difference between the two is that the “Jorgenson” 
type of models are essentially models about stocks or long run plans, while the financial 
accelerator models are about flows or the short run adjustment from one optimal stock 
position to another.  
As might be expected, the introduction in the household’s optimisation of a credit supply 
function with both a perfectly elastic section and an upward slopping part combines elements 
of both the “Jorgenson” type of investment models and the financial accelerator models (e.g. 
Steigum, 1983). A credit supply function of this type can capture the idea that when the debt-
value ratio increases above a certain threshold, the household has to pay a rising premium 
over and above what the “going” market mortgage interest rate is for the most credit-worthy 
borrowers.2 Households’ housing optimal plans depend in this extended model both on the 
“going” mortgage interest rates and on the credit standards and credit constraints that affect 
the premium function that defines what the individual household pays on top of the “going” 
mortgage rate. Other things equal, a higher debt-value ratio would signal in this case that a 
household is located more to the right of the upward credit supply function and hence facing 
higher marginal “effective” mortgage costs.3 By “effective” mortgage cost, we mean in this 
context the cost of both the interest rate and any additional contractual costs. Perhaps more 
                                                 
2 A premium of this type may take the form of a higher mortgage interest rate or a non-interest rate cost incurred 
for example when the household is asked for extra collateral, fees, an additional insurance or is faced with less 
convenient contractual mortgage terms. At the limit, credit may be rationed (for example when the debt-asset 
ratio is around 1), at which point the premium function becomes perfectly inelastic. 
3 An example of such a model is available on request to the authors. 
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interesting for the empirical work and less obvious a priori is the suggestion that the “going” 
mortgage interest rate and the credit standards or debt-value ratio may enter differently in the 
short and long run relation.  
The intuition behind this last suggestion is straightforward. Consider, for example, what 
would happen if, other things being equal, a household were given access to a higher debt-
asset ratio at the same interest rate. If the household were planning to accumulate housing 
assets and did not have sufficient own funds, the access to more debt could induce it to 
anticipate some of its housing purchases. A younger household for example would be less 
constrained by its current income and could acquire its own house sooner; an older household 
could “move up” the housing ladder faster. While the short run housing demand is thus 
affected, the long run housing plan of each household is likely to be little changed by the 
easier access to debt. In planning for the longer run the household needs to keep an eye on its 
expected “permanent” income and borrow accordingly. Flow constraints and rising marginal 
costs of debt are important primarily for the ability of households to “smooth” short run 
income variations, but less so when it comes to planning their longer run portfolio that 
includes the housing assets.4 
Interestingly for our purposes, the above distinction between short and long run effects of 
different financial factors has also some potential implications on how structural changes in 
the mortgage market may affect housing demand. As discussed below, mortgage market 
liberalisation is generally thought to have affected mostly the “premium” requested by less 
credit-worthy households. If this premium enters primarily the short term dynamics of 
housing demand, as mentioned above, financial liberalisation could have had a stronger effect 
on the short rather than the long run relation of house prices and financial factors.  
Thus, to summarise, the above discussion suggests that, when modelling house price 
dynamics, one needs to, first, consider both interest rate and credit quantity variables; second, 
allow for differences in the short and long run effects of the two type of variables; third, 
consider the possibility that these relations may have changed over time as financial market 
liberalisation has progressed, in particular, for what concerns the short run dynamics. This 
paper takes another look at all three empirical issues. 
                                                 
4 There may still be some long run effects from credit conditions other than the mortgage interest rates. For 
instance, in the above example, even though the long run housing plans of individual households do not change 
when credit constraints are relaxed, it is still true that younger people will move out of the family and acquire 
larger houses earlier in their life cycle. Thus, a relaxation of credit constraints may lead to permanently higher 
aggregate demand for housing services, though its main effect may concern the short run. 
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 5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the dataset and 
the model specification. Section 3 provides the estimation results of the benchmark model 
whereas Section 4 looks at the possible effects of financial liberalization. Finally, Section 5 
concludes.  
  
II. The Dataset and Model Specification   
As is the case with many of the house price studies in Europe, the empirical model is heavily 
conditioned by data availability. As can be seen from the Annex, data sources are disperse 
and data is of varying quality. We use only annual data, both because we believe these to be 
more reliable and because we thus have a better coverage of 11 EU countries over time.  
We use a standard error-correction model (ECM), which permits a relatively straightforward 
estimation of short and long run effects in a single equation. In particular, we start from the 
following general unrestricted ECM specification: 
(1) 
2 2
'
, , , 1 , 1
1 0
it i j i t j i t j j i t i t it
j j
y y yμ λ α ε− − − −
= =
Δ = + Δ + Δ + + +∑ ∑ X δ β X  
where 1, 2,...,t T=  and 1, 2,...,i N= , iμ  represents the country-specific intercept or fixed 
effect, ,i tX  is a 1 k×  vector of variables itx that cointegrate with ity , α  is the error-
correction coefficient determining the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium, β   
the vector of (non-normalised) long-run coefficients, and itε  the error term. Direct 
estimation of equation (1) allows us to obtain both the short-run dynamics and the long run 
response (elasticity) of ity  to an independent variable itx . The latter is directly estimated 
(and reported at the bottom of the tables with the results) from the estimates of α and of the 
respective long run parameter β as follows: -β/α.5 
The variables included are all those suggested by the theoretical model above and, more or 
less, standard in the literature. Beside the “real” house prices (RHP), our dependent variable, 
the vector ,i tX  includes the real disposable income per capita (RDIPC), the real mortgage 
rate (RMRATE), the real stock of mortgage debt per capita (RMDEBT) and the total 
population over 24 years of age  (POP), the real stock market index (RSP) as a possible 
(rather imperfect) proxy of financial wealth and two supply side variables, the residential 
                                                 
5 We opt for a single-equation rather than a two-stage ECM model, because in finite samples, under the presence 
of cointegration, the bias in the estimates of the cointegrating relationship is larger in static models than in 
dynamic models (Banerjee et al, 1986).      
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 6
housing stock (HSTOCK), and the “real” construction cost index (RCOST). Typically, in 
these relations, housing supply is considered to be inelastic in the short run. Reduced form 
housing price equations are therefore basically inverse demand equations with housing 
capital added in the long run relation to capture the long run supply effects. Even though 
housing capital may be taken as given in the short run, variations in construction costs can 
affect short term house price dynamics if they affect expectations of prices of new houses in 
the future. All variables other than the interest rate are in logs and income, debt and capital 
stock variables are normalised with the population over 24 years of age. An alternative to 
the population variable could have been the number of households, but reliable data is only 
available from censuses with five year intervals or more.6 The mortgage debt variable is 
often introduced on the grounds that there may be quantitative credit constraints but, as 
discussed above, it can be more generally interpreted as a proxy of higher marginal 
“effective” cost of mortgage debt. 
Before implementing the ECM model, we test for the order of integration of the single 
variables used in the estimation. For this purpose, two sets of assumptions can be made for 
which two standard panel procedures are available. The first test (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002 - 
LLC) employs the null hypothesis of a common unit root process across cross-sections, 
implying that the persistence or autoregressive parameter is the same across countries. The 
second test (Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) - IPS) allows for individual unit root processes 
meaning that the autoregressive coefficients vary across-sections and combines the individual 
unit root tests to derive a panel specific statistic. From the panel unit root tests (Table 1), it 
can be seen that most variables are found to be integrated of order one in level. The only 
relevant exception is the LLC test, which indicates that POP is stationary in level. All in all, 
we do not have enough evidence to discard the presence of a unit root in all the variables 
under investigation, and in what follows we will test the presence of cointegration between 
these variables in level. 
Table 2 displays the results of the panel cointegration tests of Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999). 
The Pedroni tests are based on a panel unit root test of the residuals from a regression which 
allows for heterogeneous slope coefficients, fixed effects with (or without) individual specific 
deterministic trends. These tests have the advantage of allowing the presence of heterogeneity 
of the co-integrating vectors, but the obvious drawback is that in the presence of small T, the 
                                                 
6 Additionally, there could be a spurious correlation between house market conditions and the number of 
households, if the former influence the timing young people leave the parents’ house, as mentioned above in 
footnote 4. 
Page 44 of 69
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 7
country-specific estimates may be subject to substantial biases, above all when a large 
number of non-stationary variables are included. As a result, we also implements Kao tests. 
The latter follow the same basic approach as the Pedroni tests, but specify cross-section 
specific intercepts and homogeneous slope coefficients in the cointegrating regression. Both 
the Pedroni and the Kao statistics are constructed to test the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration.7        
Table 2 shows these cointegration tests for the specifications either with fixed effects or with 
fixed effects and individual linear trends. With the only exception of the group-t test, no test 
rejects the null of no cointegration in the general specification in column (1) (RHP, RDIPC, 
RMRATE, POP, HSTOCK, RCOST, RMDEBT and RSP). Columns (2), (3) and (4) test for the 
presence of cointegration between a subset of the variables included in the general 
specification. Again, except for the panel and group t-statistics of the standard model 
accounting for demographic and supply conditions, no test supports the presence of 
cointegration. Finally, column (5) shows the results for the basic three-variable model in 
RHP, RDIPC and RMRATE. Four tests reject the null of no cointegration in the specification 
without individual linear trends. From the above results, Pedroni tests suggest the presence of 
cointegration for more parsimonious models. Kao tests, on the other hand, provide evidence 
of cointegration in all specifications. All in all, we take these tests to suggest that we should 
start with a rather general specification, including a wider range of the above variables, 
particularly, if the focus is with the pooled panel regressions, as is here the case.   
Before discussing the main results, two econometric aspects are worth mentioning from the 
outset. Firstly, due to the annual frequency of the dataset and the resulting problems of 
degrees of freedom which may result from the estimation of country-specific models, we will 
impose homogenous parameters across countries. At the same time, however, we allow for 
heterogeneity by including fixed effects and, as a robustness check, also individual linear 
trends. The former captures the impact of all time-invariant determinants of house price 
growth, whereas the latter accounts for potentially omitted trending determinants of house 
prices (see below for a discussion). For comparison, we also present the results from a 
regression where we allow country heterogeneity in short term dynamics. The second 
econometric aspect refers to the choice of estimation method. The use of fixed effects and a 
lagged term in an ECM specification raises the question whether our estimates are 
                                                 
7 Gutierrez (2003) shows that the power of Kao and Pedroni tests is sensitive to the time and cross-country 
dimension of the panel. As a result, these tests should be interpreted with caution and assessed in combination 
with our ECM strategy. 
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inconsistent as is the case in typical dynamic panel models with a small time dimension. 
However, the typical Arellano-Bond methodology applied to dynamic panel data models is 
designed for samples with a large cross-section, which is not the case in our dataset, and, 
more importantly, our panel is large enough in the time dimension, suggesting  that the use of 
the ordinary fixed effects model is more appropriate in our case. 
 
 
III. Estimation Results of Benchmark Model  
Table 3 presents the empirical results from ECM models. We start with the standard 
benchmark model, of the “Jorgenson” type, where the only explicit financial variable is the 
real mortgage interest rate. The other independent variables are the real disposable income 
per capita, the population over 24 years of age, the housing capital stock per capita and the 
real construction cost index. The disposable income variable may capture in the short run 
both the change in expected life cycle income and the possible effects of additional internal 
finance. In a “Jorgenson” type of world, the availability of internal finance should not be of 
relevance in principle, but changes in disposable income are still likely to have an effect on 
housing demand via the expectation channel.  
In a first general specification (not presented here) we introduced all independent variables in 
both lagged levels and first differences to capture long and short run effects. We have 
experimented with contemporaneous and lagged first differences. It turned out that the 
contemporaneous first difference of income, the lagged first difference of real mortgage rates 
and the contemporaneous and lagged difference of construction costs sufficiently capture the 
short term dynamics. Housing stock and population enter only in the long run relation.8   
Column 1 in Table 3 presents the estimation results from the “trimmed” version of the 
benchmark model, after having dropped the statistically non significant short term effects. All 
estimated coefficients have the expected signs and reasonable orders of magnitude. In the 
short run, an increase in real income of 1% is estimated to raise real house prices in the same 
period by close to 0.6%. An increase of the mortgage interest rate by 100 basis points is 
estimated to bring down real house prices by close to 0.5% with one year delay. A rise of real 
construction costs is found to have a positive but short lived effect, which is largely reversed 
                                                 
8 In preliminary estimates we have also added year fixed effects. The inclusion of the latter, however, makes the 
effect of the real interest rate in the long run insignificant. This could well be a reflection of the fact that real 
interest rates have had broadly similar long term patterns in most EU countries, though changes have not always 
been synchronised. The short run effect of interest rates remains statistically significant and quantitatively 
important. The rest of the results changed little when time dummies were present.   
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a year later. A significant part of a house price increase/decrease would seem to carry over to 
the next year. The “persistence” coefficient (of the lagged dependent variable) is estimated to 
be above 0.5. In the long run, the main effects come from the disposable income and 
population variables. The elasticity of real house prices with respect to income is estimated to 
1, that with respect to population to 2.8. The elasticity with respect to housing capital stock is 
-1.4, although only statistically significant at 10% level. The estimated semi-elasticity with 
respect to the real mortgage rate is -1.3 and the elasticity with respect to real construction 
costs is 0.1. Both, however, are not statistically significant. All in all, these findings are 
qualitatively consistent with a number of recent empirical studies on house price 
determination (see OECD, 2005 for a survey).     
The model in column (1) shows signs of autocorrelation (see bottom of the table). Moreover, 
the residuals from individual countries show some long term pattern. The residuals from 
Germany in particular have a clear negative trend. Finally, for some countries, there seems to 
be much more noise in the data in the first years of the sample, possibly due to more 
measurement errors in that period. Italy and Belgium present the clearest cases of this. In the 
following regressions, we consider these issues in more detail.  
A priori, we would expect that some of the above problems, particularly those concerning 
autocorrelation and the long term patterns in the residuals, may be due to omitted variables 
and/or systematic measurement errors. Even before turning to the financial side, we can think 
of different potential omitted factors, some of them concerning the supply side, such as 
construction land availability and cost, innovations in construction technology, changing 
social habits, urbanisation and regulations etc. Further, systematic measurement errors may 
arise among other things because of failing to correct prices for changes in house 
characteristics in terms of quality, size, location or amenities. This type of factors and errors 
are very hard to measure, but one may reasonably assume that they are likely to have changed 
more or less monotonically over a number of years, though not necessarily with the same rate 
across countries. If so, a country specific trend variable could be expected to capture much of 
their effect. The drawback of course is that by effectively de-trending our data we are 
removing a lot of variation, potentially making the long run coefficients ill-determined. 
Therefore, we present results from both regressions with and without country-specific trends. 
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Like ordinary dummy variables, country-specific trends do not tell us of course much about 
the true underlying factors driving the long run relations.9  
Thus, in column (2) of the table, we re-estimate the model of column (1) introducing also 
country specific deterministic trends. The trend coefficients are statistically significant 
(χ2(11)=49), though it should be said that much of the explanatory power of the trends comes 
from Germany. In terms of the rest of the estimates, the introduction of country specific 
trends changes somewhat the short term dynamics and the long run elasticities (which are 
now conditional on the trends). Qualitatively, however, previous results change little. The 
statistical significance of the coefficients in the long run relation does change, however, and 
we can now reject the hypothesis that the long run effect of interest rates is zero. The 
coefficient of the population term, on the other hand, turns out to be statistically insignificant. 
Evidently, the trend variables capture some of the effect of the population term. Finally, even 
with trend variables we reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 10% level.  
We consider next amending the financial side of the model. Hence, we depart from the 
standard “Jorgenson” type of model and introduce two extra financial variables, the mortgage 
debt per capita and the stock market index (both in real terms). Stock market prices affect the 
households’ wealth, and thus the availability of internal financing, but could also capture 
expectations about the future (Sutton, 2002; Kakes and van den End, 2004). They may also 
capture the opportunity cost of investing in housing (to the extent that housing is treated as a 
normal portfolio decision by households), though in this latter case there should be negatively 
related with real house prices. Mortgage debt reflects the external financial conditions faced 
by households, on the credit supply side, but also capture changes in the demand for credit. 
We use, therefore, the lagged value of mortgage debt growth as instrument.10 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 present respectively the amended model without and with the 
trend variables. In both cases, the introduction of the two financial variables improves 
significantly the explanatory power of the model. Autocorrelation tests also improve.  
                                                 
9 Hassler (1999) shows that a significant time trend may indicate omission of a variable with a linear trend in 
mean from the cointegrating regression. In this respect, the inclusion of trends may help to hint at miss-
specification.    
10 We also experimented with a number of additional instruments like the lagged change in long run interest 
rate, the lagged real disposable income growth and the lagged change in private debt per capita though, in 
practice, these made relatively little difference to the results. Note also that we lose 34 observations due to the 
unavailability of mortgage debt data. Re-estimating the model in columns (1) and (2) with the smaller data set 
leaves most of the results unchanged.  
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The estimated coefficients confirm the positive relation of house prices with both mortgage 
debt and stock prices in the short run. Quantitatively, the short run effect of stock market 
prices on house prices is relatively small. This is not surprising given the presumambly small 
share of equity in the typical household portfolio in our sample. Instead, the role of mortgage 
financing is quantitatively important. A 1% rise in mortgage debt is related to roughly 0.5%-
0.6% short run increase in house prices, ceteris paribus. The rest of the short run coefficients 
also change with the introduction of the two financial variables. Most noteworthy is the drop 
in the coefficient estimates for the lagged dependent variable and of income in the short run. 
In other words, part of what appeared previously as “persistence” in house price dynamics or 
as an income effect, is now explained as an effect on house prices from changes in credit 
availability. The estimated impulse effect of interest rates also falls somewhat below -0.4.  
In the long run, stock market prices turn out to be statistically insignificant, while mortgage 
debt is estimated to have a relatively moderate but persistently positive effect on real house 
prices (long run elasticity of about 0.2-0.3). When dropping mortgage debt from the long run 
relation, the long run semi elasticity of house prices with respect to interest rates rises by 
about 0.5 in both models (while that of income and the other variables remains largely 
unchanged). Mortgage interest rates and mortgage debt would seem to capture in part the 
same long run effect of “financial conditions” on house prices.  
The long run elasticity with respect to income rises in this model close to 1.5. In contrast, the 
long run effect of population, capital stock and construction costs turn out to be statistically 
insignificant in both models. This does not necessarily mean that all of these factors have not 
played a role for long run house price developments. Capital stock and, to certain extent, 
population grow at a relatively stable rate year by year and this makes it difficult to get 
reliable estimates of their long run effect, especially when time trends are introduced. In some 
of the specifications population dynamics seem to play a role for long term house price 
developments. On the other hand, the statistical insignificance of construction costs and 
capital stock may also indicate that the main supply side factor may have been land 
availability (and cost), rather than the availability and construction cost of the buildings.11 
Whatever the case may be, we find that we can drop the population and supply side variables 
                                                 
11  Having said that, it is possible that construction bottlenecks could have caused temporary increases of costs 
and prices, as the short run construction cost coefficient suggests. The (rather poor) information available on 
land prices suggests that these have tended to increased much faster over the long run both compared to house 
prices and, even more so, compared to construction costs (see ECB, 2003).  
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from the long run relation with little effect on the rest of the estimation coefficients and this is 
what we do in the rest of the empirical investigation. 
Summarising so far, we can say that there is a strong case for amending the standard 
(“Jorgenson type”) house price model by introducing mortgage debt (and stock prices). Short 
term house price dynamics, in particular, seem to have been driven by financial factors 
(interest rates, mortgage debt, stock market prices), as well as by variations in income and 
construction costs. Point estimates vary somewhat from specification to specification, but 
qualitatively the results are robust to changes in the model. In the long run, we find that 
income has been the main driving factor. The long run elasticity of house prices with respect 
to income is estimated between 1 and 1.5. The estimated semi-elasticity of house prices with 
respect to interest rates is relatively low, somewhere between -1 and -2, with respect to 
mortgage debt is around 0.3. Country-specific deterministic trends could be capturing omitted 
variables in the long run relation, possibly related to supply and demographics.  
The “preferred”, more concise model (without and with trends) is presented in the first two 
columns of Table 4. The same comments apply as above. The rest of Table 4 shows some 
variations of the “preferred” model. In column 3, we re-estimate the model (with the trends) 
lagging the mortgage debt instruments by two periods to ensure that we are not capturing any 
feedback from house prices to mortgage debt. The estimate of the impulse effect of debt is 
always statistically significant and quantitatively important, albeit somewhat lower 
(compared to that in column (2)). All the remaining short and long dynamics are similar, 
though the “persistence” coefficient (of the lagged dependent variable) rises again to 0.5. 
This interaction between the short term house price dynamics attributable to changes in the 
mortgage debt and the “persistence” in house price inflation is of some interest as will be 
seen in the next section.    
In column 4 of Table 4 we estimate the model allowing for heterogeneous dynamics in the 
different countries. In particular, the short run terms are country specific, while we pool the 
long term coefficients. The main difference in these estimates compared to our preferred 
model in column (2) concerns the effect of the mortgage interest rate. The new coefficient 
estimates suggest that, in the short run, the negative effect of mortgage interest rates may be 
smaller, but the long run elasticity is actually higher. Other than that, the point estimates, 
particular in the long run, remain relatively stable, though the coefficient associated with the 
real mortgage debt turns out to be statistically insignificant in the long run. The average 
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across countries of the individual short term factors are also similar to the pooled models. 
This model, however, seems to suffer serious problems of autocorrelation.12 
 
IV. Possible Effects of Financial Liberation  
So far, we have followed much of the existing empirical literature and assumed that the house 
price relation has remained stable over time. One of the most obvious reasons why this may 
not have been the case is the liberalisation of the financial system. The literature has 
extensively documented a number of structural changes in the financial system in general and 
in the mortgage markets in particular, over our observation period. Though changes have 
varied in form and in timing, there has been something of a common pattern in most EU 
countries. This broadly involved a move away from interest rate caps and quantitative 
constraints in the late seventies and eighties, a relaxation of the rules on the specialisation of 
credit institutions and a gradual deregulation of the mortgage markets mostly in the eighties 
and early nineties and, more recently, measures aimed at promoting consumer protection and 
mortgage debt securitisation. In some countries, there has also been a parallel move towards 
bank privatisation and a related market restructuring as well as a reduction of state 
activities/direct subsidies in promoting owner occupation, though often a strong bias towards 
owner occupation and mortgage credit remained (or was even strengthened) in the tax system 
(IMF (2000), ECB (2003), IMF (2008)). 
Mortgage market liberalisation is believed to have made access to credit easier for a large 
number of households that were previously effectively excluded from the market. More 
competition and better credit rating techniques should have led mortgage lending institutions 
to give less weight on current income and wealth when evaluating the credit worthiness of a 
household and put more weight on factors signalling (rightly or wrongly) high future income. 
Moreover, with a wider variety of products available in the market and a more persistent 
marketing of these products by credit institutions, households, particularly young households, 
are thought to have been better able to find the mortgage products that best fit their income 
profile. Thus, they should have been less constrained by their current income and wealth and 
                                                 
12 In preliminary analysis, we also re-estimated the preferred model (with trends) using Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares (FGLS), taking account of period-specific heteroscedasticity. As mentioned earlier, noise in data 
appears to be much higher in early periods, possibly because of measurement errors. With FGLS point estimates 
change somewhat, but results remain on the whole very much the same. Standard errors decrease for all 
coefficients.  
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would have had access to larger loan-to-value or debt-to-asset ratios for the same cost, other 
things being equal.  
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to time precisely these changes or to find one or more 
indicators that could measure mortgage market “liberalisation” in different countries over a 
longer period of time. Most of the indicators we could think of either concerned one specific 
aspect of the market – indeed often they were market outcomes - that may or may not have 
been the result of “liberalisation” (e.g. loan-to-value ratios) or were unreliably measured over 
a longer period of time (e.g. mortgage market concentration or penetration) or both. A first 
attempt to estimate the direct short run effect of liberalisation measures using dummy 
variables constructed on the basis of information on mortgage market deregulation from ECB 
(2003) and Lacat and Mesonnier (2005) (see Annex) has given poor results. 13 
Clearly, one of the biggest problems with such an exercise is that of the correct dating of 
“liberalisation measures”, assuming a single date does indeed exists. More likely, regulatory 
and other changes in the mortgage market have taken longer periods to complete and had 
gradual effects on market practices. Moreover, in view of what was said earlier, there is no 
reason to believe that such changes can be captured by a shift in the country-specific intercept 
of the house price model, with no effects on the rest of the relation between financial 
variables and house prices. If financial liberalisation has affected, as argued above, the 
underlying credit standards and constraints imposed by lenders, one should expect that they 
would affect the elasticity of house prices with respect to the financial variables. Moreover, in 
line with what was said in the first section, the change in credit standards and credit 
constraints would have affected first and above all the timing of housing purchases and less 
so the long run household portfolio. Thus, the effect of financial liberalisation on the short 
and long run dynamics of housing demand and housing prices could have well been different.  
We look therefore at different sub-periods of our sample and check whether estimated 
changes in coefficients are consistent with what the literature on mortgage markets would 
suggest should have happened. Clearly, we can not exclude that any changes over time in 
short term dynamics and/or long term elasticities of the house price equation could have been 
                                                 
13 In particular, we constructed a dummy which takes the value of 1 in the year such measures were 
implemented, and 0 otherwise. A second dummy was assigned a value of 1 after the major measure was applied, 
and 0 otherwise. We introduced the two dummies in the preferred model of columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 and 
found that they have a quantitatively small impact and are statistically insignificant. Varying somewhat the time 
frame (e.g. introducing dummies with a lag compared to a liberalisation measure and/or allowing each dummy 
to cover more than one year) did not provide any more interesting results. In all of the regressions, the rest of the 
estimated coefficients were unaffected by the introduction of these dummies. 
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the product of other unidentified structural changes, more or less common to all European 
countries. The results that follow, therefore, offer some indications/suggestions, but cannot be 
read as a formal test of the financial liberalisation hypothesis.  
We rerun the “preferred” model (of column 1 and 2, Table 4) allowing the coefficients of all 
independent variables to change from 1990 onwards. The year 1990 is arbitrarily chosen as a 
possible “break point” because it divides our sample roughly half way. A priori, 1990 is not a 
bad choice since many countries completed important steps of their financial liberalisation 
programmes around that time. It should nevertheless be mentioned that using alternative 
breaking points gives very similar results. As further steps, below we also present results 
from regressions that allow the breaking point to vary from country to country as well as 
results from rolling regressions. 
Table 5 presents the results of two regressions. The first provides separate estimates of the 
coefficients for the period before and after 1990 for the model without country-specific 
trends. The second does the same for the model with trends. Clearly, these models are over-
parameterised, containing as they do, apart from trends, 11 fixed effects and 2x10 
independent variables. Point estimates should therefore be considered with caution, though 
the direction of change of these coefficients before and after 1990 is potentially of interest. 
The estimates suggest that short term house price dynamics have changed considerably. 
Though there are some differences in the estimated parameters of the two models, with and 
without trends, the essential message is the same. The most important changes observed in 
the estimated parameters after 1990 are the drop of the income impulse effect (from about 0.5 
to about 0.1) and that of debt (from 0.7 to about 0.1) and the corresponding increase of the 
short run effect of an interest rate change (from about -0.4 to about -0.6) and the coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variable from below 0.4 to about 0.6).   
While these changes in the short term dynamics of house prices are of interest on their own, it 
is important to note that the empirical long run relation between house prices, income, 
interest rates and mortgage debt turns out to be relatively stable between the two sub-periods 
of our sample.14 In particular, the estimated long run elasticity of prices with respect to 
                                                 
14 A Wald test does not reject the hypothesis of constant long run coefficients (χ2(4)=3.3, χ2(4)=1.5 in the two 
models respectively). This observation needs some qualification however. When the model is run separately for 
the sub periods, as is done below, we can observe some changes in the long run elasticities. In particular, it 
seems that at least in some specifications the long run elasticity with respect to income rises in more recent 
times, though it is more difficult then to directly compare point estimates from different models. Concerning the 
short run relation, we can reject the hypothesis of constant coefficients at 10% level in the model without trends 
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income and with respect to debt remained stable. There is no indication of a long run “de-
linking” of house prices and income. The semi-elasticity with respect to interest rates would 
seem to have changed somewhat, but given that this coefficient is not very accurately 
estimated, we cannot reject that also this has remained constant between the two sub periods.  
In line with what was discussed earlier, our tentative interpretation is that changes in financial 
structures had an impact primarily on short term dynamics, reducing, ceteris paribus, the 
marginal cost of mortgage debt (i.e. relaxing the credit standards that determine the 
“premium” a household has to pay as its indebtedness rises). The short run elasticity of house 
prices with respect to interest rates increased as a result.  
While changes in financial structures led households to anticipate house purchases, longer 
run housing demand may not have been much influenced. Being able to borrow more and to 
borrow earlier in the life cycle can raise the speed with which households realise their 
housing plans. For example it can reduce the average age of first-time buyers, but in the 
longer run housing plans should not change much. Income growth would appear to remain 
the main factor affecting these plans in the long run.   
The natural question that follows empirically is whether we should not allow also the error 
structure to vary from one sub-period to another, given that, as mentioned earlier, 
measurement and other errors may have also changed over the 35 years we are considering. 
Thus, in Table 6 we re-estimate the model separately for the two sub-periods (columns 1 and 
2). Given the short time frame of each sub-period (and the reduced degrees of freedom), we 
comment only on the regressions without time trends. It should be said, however, that the 
absence of time trends makes adjustment to the long run appear much slower. Additionally, 
given the stability of the long run coefficients, for both sub-sample we include the same error 
correction term (ECM), which apart from house prices, includes income, mortgage interest 
rates and mortgage debt. We fix the respective elasticities at 1.1, -2.3 and 0.3, which are the 
long run coefficients estimated imposing the same cointegrating relationship for the two sub-
periods.15  
These regressions do not impose the same error structure and the same country fixed effects 
in the two sub periods. Nevertheless, the qualitative results are very similar to those of Table 
                                                                                                                                                        
(χ2(6)=10.5), but not in the model with trends (χ2(6)=7.9), presumably because of the over-parametrisation of 
the latter. 
15 We have also tested for richer short term variables, including DRMRATE, DRDIPC(-1), DRCOST(-1), but 
they all turn out to be statistically insignificant. The shorter time periods and the fewer degrees of freedom do 
not allow for that much further experimentation.  
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5. One can see again that the factors entering the house price short term dynamics seem to 
have changed over time, with financial “price” variables (interest rate and to lesser extent 
share prices) being more important in recent years than was the case before 1990. Instead, the 
impulse effect of income and debt turn out to be statistically insignificant (and quantitatively 
smaller) in the more recent period.  
In the last two columns of Table 6, we repeat the exercise, this time allowing for break points 
that vary by country using the dates of the major financial deregulation measures mentioned 
earlier (see Annex).16 For most countries, the break point now appears earlier than 1990 and, 
indeed, for West Germany the whole sample (starting in the mid-70s) is now attributed to the 
post-liberalisation period. In our view, this makes it more difficult to interpret the results. 
With all caveats in mind, therefore, one may observe that the results outlined in first two 
columns seem robust to this alternative splitting procedure, the most noticeable difference 
being that the impulse effect of mortgage debt remains in these latter model high also in the 
post-liberalisation period, albeit reduced compared to the pre-liberalisation period. 
As a final test, on the basis of the fact the exact time period when financial liberalization took 
place may not be know with precision ex ante, and that the impact of financial liberalization 
on market behavior may have been gradual, rather than immediate, we also estimate rolling 
regressions using a 15-year window. Here, due to the relatively short sample we keep 
imposing the same cointegrating relationship as in the first two columns of Table 5. Figure 1 
provides the estimated coefficients of the short term dynamics. Although the wide confidence 
bands point to a high degree of uncertainty around the point estimates, the rolling coefficients 
are consistent with a gradual transition from the pre- to the post-liberalization period. The 
clearest changes seem to be the drop of the impulse effect of mortgage debt and an increase 
in the “persistence” factor (the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable). There seems to 
be also a gradual change in the impulse effect of income, mortgage interest rates and share 
prices along the lines mentioned earlier.    
To summarise, one way of describing the changes observed in the short term dynamics is to 
say that pricing of housing assets has become more akin to that of financial assets, i.e. their 
demand being more influenced by interest rates and past capital gains (feeding through 
                                                 
16 For reasons of consistency, we actually follow again the same two step procedure, whereby we first estimate 
this model in a similar way as in Table 5, only now with country specific break points, and then use the long run 
coefficients of that model to construct the ECM variable. The long run elasticities from the first step estimation 
with country-specific break points are 1, -1.6 and 0.2 for income, mortgage interest rates and mortgage debt 
respectively.  
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expectations) and less so by household income and quantitative financial constraints. The 
apparent “de-linking” of house prices from income developments has been an issue of some 
speculation recently, when house prices continued to grow strongly in a number of EU 
countries even during the downturn in economic activity of the last few years of our sample. 
This was generally attributed to the changes in the financial system that should have made it 
easier for households to access external finance for a given (current) income and given 
availability of own-capital.17 Similarly, the higher impulse effect of interest rates on house 
prices is along the lines of the argument put forward by Iacoviello and Minetti (2003) on the 
possible effects of financial liberalisation on the impact of interest rate shocks on house 
prices. To our knowledge, the reduction of the impulse effect of quantitative credit variables 
on house prices has not been noted in the literature, though one could rationalise this as a sign 
of credit constraints becoming less binding.  
Before concluding, we comment briefly on the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable, which in all models seems to have increased in the post-liberalisation period. We 
interpret this as a sign that in a world where households can enter/exit the mortgage and 
housing markets more easily and manage their portfolios, including their housing assets, 
more actively, house buying/selling decisions may more often be made with an eye to capital 
gains, than was the case in the past. If there are extrapolative elements in households’ 
expectations, recent house price movements may feed more strongly into current housing 
demand decisions.  
This interpretation is not the only one, but seems a plausible one and finds some support in 
the literature. Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) argued, in particular, that such behaviour could 
give rise to “frenzies” if there is a large number of speculative traders in the market. 
Following a similar approach to that paper, we could not detect evidence of “frenzies” in the 
sense used by Muellbauer and Murphy, but we do find evidence of a more complex dynamic 
adjustment in house prices in recent years.18 In particular, while house price increases tended 
                                                 
17 This argument is not uncontroversial. For instance Almeida et al (2006) and Lamont and Stein (1999) find 
that the sensitivity of housing prices to household income changes is positively related to a relaxation of 
financial constraints. Following the former, we also interact the change in per capita real disposable income with 
the maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios which they use as proxy for financial liberalization. Results (not 
shown here but available upon request) show that the interaction term is statistically insignificant. This may be 
due to the different country sample which in our case is much more homogeneous but also to the quality of their 
financial constraint index. 
18 Following an earlier suggestion of Hendry (1984), Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) introduced a cubic 
function of the lagged house price increases to capture possible non-linearities due to such “frenzy” effects. In 
our model, when entering the second lag of the dependent variable in both linear and cubic form, they both 
turned out statistically significant in the more recent period but with opposite signs (the coefficient of the cubic 
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to be followed (ceteris paribus) by further increases in the two next years, extreme 
movements of house prices in one year (of over 15% positive or negative) tended to be 
followed by a reversal two years later. This could be a sign of a more complex household 
expectation mechanism (which interprets extreme movements as “bubbles”) but it could also 
be for instance the result of supply catching up with demand shocks. Whatever the case, we 
think that the question of whether changes in the housing and mortgage markets have actually 
altered the way households make housing decisions and form their expectations of house 
prices is an interesting one and probably one that warrants further research.  
 
V. Conclusions 
The relation between financial factors and house price dynamics has been in the limelight in 
recent years. The observed interest rate channel is probably just one part of this relation. 
Typically, mortgage contracts make reference to more elements than the interest rate, all of 
which may affect the “effective” cost of mortgage debt and quantity constraints are not 
uncommon in this market. As argued in the first section of this paper, this suggests that, when 
modelling house price dynamics, one needs to, first, consider the credit quantity variables 
alongside the interest rate and, second, allow for differences in the short and long run effects 
of the two type of variables. Finally, one should consider the possibility that these relations 
may have changed over time as financial market liberalisation has progressed. 
Relying on a standard single equation reduced form model, expanded to include supply side 
variables and deterministic country specific time trends, we find that, alongside with income 
and construction costs, (lagged) interest rates, mortgage debt and, to lesser degree, stock 
market developments have had a significant impact on short term house price dynamics in 
our sample of EU countries since the early 1970s. In the long run, the elasticity of (real) 
house prices with respect to (real) income is found to lie between 0.9 and 1.5, the semi-
elasticity with respect to interest rates between -1.2 and –2.6. Mortgage debt seems also to 
enter in the long run relation, albeit with a relatively low elasticity (around 0.3).  
When we split our sample to check for possible effects of financial liberalisation, we find that 
the relation between financial factors and house price dynamics is much more complex and 
                                                                                                                                                        
term is negative). Taking the point estimates literally, the model suggests that, for low house price 
increases/decreases, the effect of the cubic term roughly cancels out with the second lag of the dependent 
variable. For growth rates exceeding 15% (or below -15%), the overall effect becomes increasingly negative 
(positive).  
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less stable than what the initial models would seem to suggest. The changes between the two 
sub-periods concern mainly short-term dynamics and in general they are consistent with what 
one would expect the likely effect of financial liberalisation have been on house price 
dynamics.  
In particular, the impulse effect on house prices of income and mortgage debt has become 
smaller, while that of interest rates, past increases of house prices and, to lesser degree, stock 
market has strengthened. In other words, there seems to have been a certain “de-linking” of 
short term house price dynamics from “real” income accompanied with a certain change 
whereby the housing market may have become more similar to a financial market, with 
interest rates and expectations of capital gains playing a more prominent role. It remains to be 
seen whether this change attracts more speculative traders in the market, in which case, as 
Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) argued, there could be more housing “frenzies” than was the 
case in the past in Europe.    
From a policy point of view, it is also interesting to note that we find little evidence of 
important changes over time in the long run relation. Income growth seems to have continued 
dominating the long run path of real house prices, though it should be added that other 
factors, notably demographics and supply side variables, may also play an important role 
captured in our models by the country specific deterministic trends. In other words, financial 
liberalisation may have given the opportunity to households to “move up the housing ladder” 
earlier and, thus, anticipate their demand for housing services, but, the long run close relation 
of real house price rises and income growth seems to still hold true, “anchoring” as it were 
long run house price dynamics. 
In conclusion, we think the question of whether changes in financial structures have affected 
house price dynamics and, in particular, whether the more favourable credit conditions have 
affected primarily the short term house price dynamics warrant further investigation. This 
paper puts an argument why this may be the case and provides some tentative results that 
support this hypothesis. Future research will probably need more reliable information on how 
credit standards may have changed over time as a result of structural changes in the mortgage 
markets and how these affected housing demand, housing prices and household expectations 
thereoff. 
 
 
Page 58 of 69
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 21
References 
Almeida, H., M. Campello and C. Liu (2006), “The Financial Accelerator: Evidence from 
International Housing Markets”, Review of Finance, Vol. 10, pp. 1-32. 
Banerjee, A., J. J. Dolado, D. F. Hendry and G. W. Smith (1986), “Exploring Equilibrium 
Relationships in Econometrics through Static Models: Some Monte Carlo Evidence”, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, pp. 253-277. 
Drake, L. (1993), “Modelling UK House Prices Using Cointegration: An Application of the 
Johansen Technique”, Applied Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 1225-1228. 
Englund, P. and Y.M. Ioannides (1997), “House Price Dynamics: an International Empirical 
Perspective”, Journal of Housing Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 119-136. 
European Central Bank (2003), “Structural factors in the EU Housing Market”, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/euhousingmarketsen.pdf. 
Gutierrez, L. (2003), “On the Power of Panel Cointegration Tests: a Monte Carlo 
Comparison”, Economic Letters, Vol. 80, pp. 105-111. 
Hassler, U. (1999), “(When) Should Cointegrating Regressions be De-trended? The Case of 
a German Money Demand Function”, Empirical Economics, Vol. 24, pp. 155-172. 
Hendry, D F, (1984), “Econometric Modeling of House Prices in the UK”, in Econometrics 
and Quantitative Economics (ed), D F Hendry and K F Wallis, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Hofmann, B. (2003), “Bank Lending and Property Prices: Some International Evidence”, 
Working Paper, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Policy, No. 22/2003. 
Hofmann, B. (2004), “The Determinants of Bank Credit in Industrialized Countries: Do 
Property Prices Matter?”, International Finance, Vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 203-234. 
Kakes, J. and J.W. van den End (2004), “Do Stock Prices Affect House Prices? Evidence 
from the Netherlands”, Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 11, pp. 741-744. 
Kao, C. (1999), “Spurious Regression and Residual-based Tests for Cointegration in Panel 
Data”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 90, pp. 1-44. 
Kasparova, D. and M. White (2001), “The Responsiveness of House Prices to 
Macroeconomic Forces: a Cross-Country Comparison”, European Journal of Housing 
Policy, Vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 385-416. 
Kennedy N. and P. Andersen (1994), “Housing Saving and the Real House Prices: an 
International Prospective”, BIS Working Paper, no. 20, January. 
Iacovello, M. and R. Minetti (2003), “Financial Liberalization and the Sensitivity of House 
Prices to Monetary Policy: Theory and Evidence”, The Manchester School, Vol. 71, no. 
1, pp. 20-34.  
Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H., and Y. Shin (2003), "Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous 
Panels," Journal of Econometrics, 115, 53-74. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2000), “Asset Prices and the Business Cycle”, Wold 
Economic Outlook, Chapter 3, May. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)  (2004), “What Explains the Recent Run-up in House 
Prices?”, World Economic Outlook, Chapter 2, September. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008), “The Changing Housing Cycle and the 
Implications for Monetary Policy”, in World Economic Outlook, Chapter 3, April.  
Lamont, O. and J. Stein (1999), “Leverage and Housing Price Dynamics in US Cities”, 
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 30, pp. 498-514. 
Lecat, R. and J.S. Mesonnier, (2005), “What Role Do Financial Factors Play in House Price 
Dynamics”, Bulletin de la Banque de France, No.134, February.  
Page 59 of 69
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 22
Levin, A., Lin, C. F., and C. Chu (2002), "Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and 
Finite-Sample Properties," Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 108, pp. 1-24. 
McGibany, J.M. and F. Nourzad (2004), "Do Lower Mortgage Rates Mean Higher Housing 
Prices?”, Applied Economics, Vol. 36, pp. 305-313.  
Meen, G. (1990), “The Removal of Mortgage Market Constraints and the Implications for 
Econometric Modelling of UK House Prices”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 1-24. 
Muellbauer, J. and A. Murphy (1997), “Booms and Busts in the UK Housing Market”, 
Economic Journal, Vol. 107, pp. 1701-1727. 
OECD (2005), “Recent House Price Dynamics: The Role of Fundamentals”, OECD 
Economic Outlook, no. 78, pp. 124-154. 
Ott (2006), “Long Run House Price Equilibrium and Short Term Dynamics in the Euro 
Area”, University of Munich, mimeo.  
Pedroni, P. (1999), “Critical Values for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels with 
Multiple Regressors”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 61, pp. 653-678. 
Steigum, E. (1983), “A Financial Theory of Investment Behaviour”, Econometrica, Vol. 51, 
pp. 637–645. 
Sutton, G. D. (2002), “Explaining Changes in House Prices”, BIS Quarterly Review, pp. 46–
55. 
Tsatsaronis, K. and H. Zhu (2004), “What Drives Housing Price Dynamics: Cross Country 
Evidence”, BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, March. 
 
Annex: Data 
Data was collected from various international and national sources. One may find more 
information on these sources and data limitations in ECB (2003), where a large part of the 
same data set was used. We list below the main sources variable by variable and, in the case 
of house prices, country by country. The following abbreviations of sources are used: Ameco: 
European Commission Ameco database; BIS: Bank of International Settlements, ECB/ESCB: 
European Central Bank and European System of Central Banks (including individual 
National Central Bank data); ESA95: European System of Accounts 95; HS: National Agency 
for Entreprise and Housing, Denmark (see references); IFS: IMF International Financial 
Statistics; NSI: National Statistical Institute; MEI: OECD Main economic indicators; OEO: 
OECD Economic Outlook   
Nominal House Prices (HP) 
BE: BIS (based on real estate sector data)  
DK: NSI  
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WG (DE):  ECB/ESCB (based on real estate sector data) refers only to regions in ex-West 
Germany  
IE: BIS, ECB/ESCB (based on data from the Department of Environment and Local 
Government)  
ES: Ministry of Housing – prior to 1988 refers only to Madrid 
FR: ECB/ESCB, National Sources (FNAIM and ECLN)  
IT: ECB/ESCB (based on real estate sector data) - main cities. 
NL: ECB/ESCB, Land Registry Office  
FI: NSI  
SE: NSI  
UK: Real estate sector data  
RHP is constructed deflating the nominal house price with the consumer price deflator (see 
below)   
Consumer price deflator 
Sources: Eurostat, ECB/ESCB, BIS. For Euro-area countries, we used HICP data, linked 
backwards to CPI, excluding the owner-occupied component. For DK, SE and UK we used 
CPI data. An alternative deflator based on the GDP deflator was also tried and led to 
practically the same results. 
Nominal disposable income  
Sources: OEO, Ameco and national sources. For Germany, data from regions in ex-West 
Germany was used. The real disposable income per capita (RDIPC) is constructed using the 
consumer price deflator and the total population aver 24 years of age.  
Nominal mortgage interest rates 
Sources: ECB/ESCB, BIS and national sources. For some countries, mortgage interest rates 
are not available for the 1970s. We have therefore linked the existing mortgage interest rate 
series with series on long term interest rates. The real mortgage interest rate (RMRATE) is 
constructed as the difference between the nominal mortgage rate and the ex-post inflation rate 
based on the consumer price deflator.  
Long term interest rates 
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Sources: OEO, MEI, BIS, ECB. The basic definition refers to 10 year government bonds or 
the closest series we could find. For Spain from 1977 backwards we linked with the deposit 
short term interest rate. The real long term interest rate (RLRATE) is constructed as the 
difference between the nominal long term interest rate and the ex-post inflation rate based on 
the consumer price deflator.  
Mortgage debt 
Sources: ECB/ESCB, BIS, national sources. We use as main definition the end of period 
outstanding loans to households for house purposes. For missing data, we use the BIS 
“credits for domestic residential construction” data and also national source data with the 
closest possible definition. The real stock of mortgage debt per capita (RMDEBT) is 
constructed using the consumer price deflator and the total population aver 24 years of age. 
Population statistics 
Source: Eurostat. Data for Germany refers to the regions of ex-West Germany. POP is the 
total population above 24 years of age.  
Housing Stock 
The residential housing stock (HSTOCK) is calculated with the perpetual inventory method 
using residential investment data from ESA 95 and OEO. Information on number of dwellings 
per country (Housing Statistics of the European Union, 2002) was used in order to calculate 
the “benchmark” (or initial) capital for each country. This was done comparing the change in 
the actual number of dwelling over a certain period and the residential investment over the 
same period (details available from the authors). We imposed 2% annual depreciation, but 
checked that small variations to this rate made no difference to the results. For Germany, we 
used data from ex-West Germany. 
Construction costs 
Various national sources, ESA 95, OEO. Where not available, the residential investment 
deflators were used instead (linked when necessary to the rest of the construction cost data). 
The alternative, of using throughout the residential investment deflators was tried and 
produced practically the same results. Real construction costs (RCOST) is calculated using 
consumer price deflator. 
Stock exchange price index 
BIS, IFS. The real stock price index (RSP) is constructed using the consumer price deflator.  
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Dates of Mortgage market measures according to ECB (2003) and Lacat and Messonier 
(2005). 
Belgium (1977, 1995), Denmark (1982), Finland (1986, 1987), France (1987), Germany 
(1967), Ireland (1985), Italy (1983, 1988), Netherlands (1980, 1992), Spain (1987), Sweden 
(1985) and the U.K. (1980, 1986). The pre and post ‘financial liberalization’ (FL) period of 
Tables 6 is based on the date of the latest mortgage market measure.   
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Table 1 Panel Unit Root Tests  
 
 RHP RDIPC RMRATE HSTOCK POP RSP RMDEBT RCOST 
Level         
No trends         
LLC  2.38 -1.47 0.69 3.26 -6.05** 1.18 2.68 -1.24 
IPS  1.24 1.44 0.03 -1.41 0.10 1.25 5.87 -0.42 
With trends         
LLC  2.56 -0.93 2.17 -1.32 2.28 -0.88 -1.30 -0.96 
IPS  -1.18 -0.96 3.46 1.56 4.17 -1.23 -0.57 -0.50 
First  
difference 
        
LLC -4.84** -7.19** -10.72** -2.35** -0.92 -8.49** -0.87 -7.10** 
IPS -5.32** -7.53** -12.20** -0.91 -1.77** -9.12** -2.97** -7.81** 
Notes: LLC stands for the Levin, Lin and Chu tests in which it is assumed that there is a common unit root process. 
IPS stands for the panel integration tests are based on Im, Pesaran and Shin (2000). The lag order was set to 2 (1) 
for the unit root test in level (first difference). The tests are distributed asymptotically N(0,1) and are one-sided. (**) 
indicates the 5% significance level.  
 
Table 2  Pedroni and Kao Cointegration Tests  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 RHP 
RDIPC 
RMRATE 
POP 
HSTOCK 
RCOST 
RMDEBT 
RSP 
RHP 
RDIPC 
RMRATE 
POP 
HSTOCK 
RCOST 
 
RHP 
RDIPC 
RMRATE 
RMDEBT 
RSP 
RHP 
RDIPC 
RMRATE 
RMDEBT 
RHP 
RDIPC 
RMRATE 
 
 
 No Trends No Trends No Trends No Trends No Trends 
Panel v -0.34 0.76 0.44 1.31 3.43** 
Panel ρ  2.89 1.13 1.26 0.01 -1.69** 
Panel pp-t 0.10 -0.59 0.50 -0.55 -1.75** 
Panel t -0.29 0.31 0.82 -0.58 -1.59 
Group ρ  3.51 2.07 2.08 1.00 -0.52 
Group pp-t -0.62 -0.33 0.85 0.06 -1.14 
Group t -1.72** 0.28 -0.18 -1.49 -1.97** 
      
Kao ADF -4.68** -3.68** -4.48** -4.15** -2.94** 
      
 With Trends With Trends With Trends With Trends With Trends 
Panel v 0.06 0.88 -0.15 0.20 1.96** 
Panel ρ  3.62 1.53 2.55 1.64 -0.06 
Panel pp-t 0.02 -1.11 1.63 0.81 -0.74 
Panel t -0.86 -2.68** 2.27 1.10 -0.84 
Group ρ  4.31 2.65 3.28 2.38 1.05 
Group pp-t -0.90 -0.53 1.90 1.31 -0.11 
Group t -2.77** -2.22** 1.00 0.30 -0.98 
Notes: The null hypothesis for all tests is of no cointegration. All tests are distributed asymptotically N(0,1) and 
are one-sided. (**) indicates the 5% significance level. The Kao ADF test allows for fixed effects with no trends 
only. See Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999) for details. 
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Table 3 House Price Equation – Alternative Specifications  
 1 2 3 4 
DRHP(-1) 0.53*** 
(0.06) 
0.56*** 
(0.06) 
0.43*** 
(0.06) 
0.40*** 
(0.07) 
DRDIPC 0.58*** 
(0.14) 
0.54*** 
(0.15) 
0.39*** 
(0.13) 
0.36*** 
(0.14) 
DRMRATE(-1) -0.48*** 
(0.18) 
-0.42** 
(0.18) 
-0.36** 
(0.15) 
-0.38** 
(0.16) 
DRCOST 0.28*** 
(0.09) 
0.27*** 
(0.09) 
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
0.20*** 
(0.07) 
DRCOST(-1) -0.22** 
(0.09) 
-0.25*** 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
DRMDEBT   0.49*** 
(0.11) 
0.62*** 
(0.16) 
DRSP   0.04*** 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
RHP(-1) -0.13*** 
(0.02) 
-0.21*** 
(0.03) 
-0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.23*** 
(0.03) 
RDIPC(-1) 0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.35*** 
(0.09) 
RMRATE(-1) -0.17 
(0.12) 
-0.32* 
(0.14) 
-0.28*** 
(0.10) 
-0.24* 
(0.12) 
RMDEBT(-1)   0.03* 
(0.017) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
RSP(-1)   0.002 
(0.001) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
POP(-1) 0.37*** 
(0.12) 
0.44 
(0.29) 
-0.02 
(0.15) 
0.41 
(0.30) 
HSTOCK(-1) -0.18* 
(0.10) 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.17) 
RCOST(-1) 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
Long-Run  
Elasticities     
RDIPC 1.0 0.7 1.3 1.5 
RMRATE -1.3 -1.5 -1.9 -1.0 
RMDEBT   0.2 0.3 
RSP   0.01 0.4 
POP 2.8 2.1 -0.1 1.8 
HSTOCK -1.4 -0.9 -0.3 -0.5 
RCOST 0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.1 
     
Estimation Method OLS OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Country Trends no yes no yes 
R- squared 0.46 0.49 0.59 0.62 
Obs 358 358 334 334 
Autocorrelation 6.4 5.3 2.3 3.2 
 
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in brackets below the 
point estimates. * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% 
level. IV = instrumental variables. DRMDEBT is instrumented with DRMDEBT(-1). The serial correlation test is 
distributed as a 2χ  with 2 degrees of freedom and the 10% and 5% critical values are 4.61 and 5.99, respectively.   
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Table 4 House Price Equation: Robustness of ‘Preferred’ Specification 
 1 2 3 4 
DRHP(-1) 0.43*** 
(0.06) 
0.41*** 
(0.06) 
0.50*** 
(0.07) 
0.42 
DRDIPC 0.37*** 
(0.13) 
0.40*** 
(0.13) 
0.40*** 
(0.16) 
0.33 
DRMRATE(-1) -0.38** 
(0.15) 
-0.41*** 
(0.15) 
-0.41*** 
(0.15) 
-0.09 
DRCOST 0.23*** 
(0.07) 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
0.18 
DRMDEBT 0.47*** 
(0.09) 
0.59*** 
(0.12) 
0.41** 
(0.19) 
0.41 
DRSP 0.05*** 
(0.015) 
0.03** 
(0.014) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
RHP(-1) -0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.24*** 
(0.03) 
-0.24*** 
(0.03) 
-0.25*** 
(0.05) 
RDIPC(-1) 0.14*** 
(0.05) 
0.36*** 
(0.09) 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
0.37** 
(0.15) 
RMRATE(-1) -0.30*** 
(0.11) 
-0.27** 
(0.12) 
-0.33** 
(0.13) 
-0.66*** 
(0.23) 
RMDEBT(-1) 0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
     
Long-Run  
Elasticities 
    
RDIPC 0.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 
RMRATE -2 -1.1 -1.4 -2.6 
RMDEBT 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 
     
Estimation Method IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-PMG 
Individual trends no yes yes yes 
R- squared 0.59 0.63 0.65 0.66 
Obs 334 334 329 334 
Autocorrelation 1.5 1.8 1.5 12.6 
 
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in brackets below the 
point estimates. * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% 
level. IV-2SLS = instrumental variables two stage least square. DRMDEBT is instrumented with DRMDEBT(-1). 
The serial correlation test is distributed as a 2χ with 2 degrees of freedom and the 10% and 5% critical values are 
4.61 and 5.99, respectively. The last column shows the results of the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) model with 
country-specific short-run dynamics, whose simple average is shown in italics. 
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Table 5 House Price Equation: Splitting the Sample Period 
 1 2 
 Pre-1990 Post-1990 Pre-1990 Post-1990 
DRHP(-1) 0.37*** 
(0.08) 
0.63** 
(0.11) 
0.35*** 
(0.08) 
0.59* 
(0.12) 
DRDIPC 0.52** 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.20) 
0.48** 
(0.20) 
0.12 
(0.21 
DRMRATE(-1) -0.37** 
(0.18) 
-0.60** 
(0.28) 
-0.39** 
(0.19) 
-0.68* 
(0.37) 
DRCOST 0.25*** 
(0.08) 
0.18 
(0.15) 
0.25** 
(0.09) 
0.15 
(0.14 
DRMDEBT 0.64** 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.21) 
0.77*** 
(0.17) 
0.13 
(0.24 
DRSP 0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
RHP(-1) -0.17*** 
(0.03) 
-0.17*** 
(0.03) 
-0.24*** 
(0.03) 
-0.24*** 
(0.03) 
RDIPC(-1) 0.21*** 
(0.05) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
0.37*** 
(0.09) 
0.37*** 
(0.09) 
RMRATE(-1) -0.43** 
(0.15 
-0.46* 
(.28) 
-0.33* 
(0.17 
-0.64* 
(0.33) 
RMDEBT(-1) 0.06*** 
(0.017) 
0.05*** 
(0.017) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
     
Long-Run  
Elasticities     
RDIPC 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 
RMRATE -2.5 -2.7 -1.4 -2.7 
RMDEBT 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 
     
Estimation 
Method IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Individual trends no yes 
R- squared 0.59 0.61 
Obs 334 334 
Autocorrelation 2.1 3.2 
 
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in brackets below the 
point estimates. * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% 
level. IV-2SLS = instrumental variables two stage least square. DRMDEBT is instrumented with DRMDEBT(-1). 
The serial correlation test is distributed as a 2χ  with 2 degrees of freedom and the 10% and 5% critical values are 
4.61 and 5.99, respectively.   
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Table 6 House Price Equation: Additional Results 
 1 2 3 4 
 Pre-1990 Post-1990 Pre-FL Post-FL 
DRHP(-1) 0.36*** 
(0.09) 
0.59*** 
(0.10) 
0.31*** 
(0.10) 
0.49*** 
(0.09) 
DRDIPC 0.44** 
(0.21) 
0.08 
(0.15) 
0.62** 
(0.24) 
0.11 
(0.16) 
DRMRATE(-1) -0.37* 
(0.22) 
-0.58*** 
(0.21) 
-0.29 
(0.22) 
-0.42** 
(0.21) 
DRCOST 0.23** 
(0.10) 
0.19 
(0.12) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
0.30 
(0.14) 
DRMDEBT 0.71*** 
(0.18) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.73*** 
(0.22) 
0.39** 
(0.18) 
DRSP 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
ECM(-1) -0.20*** 
(0.04) 
-0.19*** 
(0.03) 
-0.31*** 
(0.05) 
-0.15*** 
(0.03) 
     
Estimation 
Method 
IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Individual trends no no no no 
R- squared 0.53 0.70 0.50 0.64 
Obs 169 165 130 204 
Autocorrelation 5.2 0.3 5.1 2.8 
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are in brackets below the 
point estimates. * = significance at the 10% level, ** = significance at the 5% level, *** = significance at the 1% 
level. IV-2SLS = instrumental variables two stage least square. DRMDEBT is instrumented with DRMDEBT(-1). 
Pre-FL and post-FL refer to the split the sample according to the country-specific “dates of financial 
liberalization” measures discussed in the Annex. The serial correlation test is distributed as a 2χ  with 2 degrees 
of freedom and the 10% and 5% critical values are 4.61 and 5.99, respectively.   
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Figure 1: Rolling Regressions: Short Run Coefficients of House Price Equation  
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Notes: Rolling regressions of preferred specification with imposed long run relationship as in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 5. The rolling window is fixed at T=15. The middle blue line is the point estimate of the correspondent 
coefficient. Confidence bands are based on ± 1.6 standard errors.     
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